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Abstract 
This study offers an in-depth economic analysis of the two main proposals for the creation of 
a European unemployment insurance scheme. One proposes the creation of a harmonised 
European unemployment benefit scheme that would apply automatically to every eligible 
unemployed person. The alternative, here termed ‘reinsurance’, would transfer funds to 
national unemployment insurance schemes to finance benefits from the centre to the 
periphery when unemployment is measurably higher than normal.  
 
The rationale behind these proposals is to set up an EU-level shock absorber to overcome 
coordination failures and the crisis-budget constraints of individual countries. The authors 
consider the possible trade-offs and challenges of, for example, the definition of the trigger, 
the fiscal rule and the harmonisation of national benefits. They conclude that while both 
options are viable, ‘reinsurance’ offers a stronger stabilisation effect for the same amount of 
European distribution. 
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An Unemployment Insurance 
Scheme for the Euro Area: 
A simulation exercise of two options 
Miroslav Beblavý and Ilaria Maselli 
CEPS Special Report No. 98 / December 2014 
Executive Summary 
This report was commissioned by the European Parliament as one of the analytical resources 
to be used in discussion of the possible creation of European-level unemployment insurance. 
The basic concept arises from the observation that if a member state is affected by slower 
growth for a period, it is likely to have higher unemployment. Further problems are likely to 
arise since a prolonged crisis implies that an increasing number of people will be 
unemployed over the long term. If the funding of compensation paid to unemployed 
workers is at the euro area level, it is more likely to come from the more prosperous areas 
and better off citizens. It is thus a redistributive tool that could contribute to stabilisation.  
The purposes of the unemployment insurance are, from a purely economic point of view, to 
provide a counter-cyclical stabilisation mechanism to the economy, and from a social point 
of view, to alleviate the pain of unemployment by providing income security.  
An EU-level mechanism could act as a shock absorber for both asymmetric and symmetric 
shocks to the economy, and thus overcome coordination failures and individual country’s 
crisis budget constraints. From a political and social point of view, it could also demonstrate 
European solidarity in a visible and tangible way to EU citizens, introduce a mechanism for 
permanent/long-term redistribution across the EU and common standards for 
unemployment support, and support labour mobility within the EU/euro area. 
Our proposals address the shock-absorber rationale as the principal rationale for a European 
unemployment insurance system (EUI), but to provide variety on more contentious issues 
some proposals will address the rationales of demonstrating European solidarity in a visible 
and tangible way for EU citizens and providing common standards. However, the proposals 
will not seek, as an overriding rationale, to promote permanent/long-term redistribution 
across the EU, but potential persistent transfers are indeed possible. We will largely leave the 
issue of supporting labour mobility within the EU/euro area out of our analysis. 
In this chapter, we delve into the economic, political and practical challenges relating to the 
creation of a supranational automatic stabiliser. The pros and cons of possible solutions are 
summarised in the following tables. 
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We start with the choice of indicator to trigger the European unemployment insurance 
system.  
 
Trigger Pros Cons 
Short-term unemployment 
rate 
Clear, unambiguous, rapid 
response to shock 
Higher variability across 
European countries 
Unemployment gap 
Captures longer-term 
impact of the shock better 
Ex post revisions 
Difficulty in setting a 
benchmark 
Conclusion: The simulation uses the unemployment gap for reinsurance and short-term 
unemployment for the ‘harmonised system’. 
 
The second issue to deal with is the fiscal rule for the system. 
Fiscal rule Pros Cons 
Annual balance 
Simplicity, no need to 
deal with borrowing 
capacity 
Unable to respond to the frequent 
combination of symmetric and 
asymmetric shocks, consequently likely 
to provide least support when most 
needed. 
No fiscal rule 
Simplicity 
Strongly anticyclical, 
especially in sustained 
downturns 
Open-ended commitment for member 
states – difficult both politically and 
technically. 
Balanced over the 
economic cycle 
A combination of 
countercyclical policy 
with constraints on 
the overall cost and 
contribution 
Technically more complex than the other 
two options 
Conclusion: The simulation will work with two options: no fiscal rule and balanced 
over the economic cycle. 
 
The third issue is the extent to which there should be harmonisation of the national 
standards for unemployment benefits under the European system and conditionality for use 
of the newly established EU funds in this area. 
Coordination of rules Pros Cons 
Common 
unemployment 
benefit standards 
Clarity 
Strong signal of Social 
Europe for citizens 
Requires politically challenging 
unification 
Provides less scope for incorporating 
national preferences 
Conditionality of use 
of EUI 
Strong anticyclical 
impact guaranteed 
Higher political/social 
support 
Alternative uses by national 
governments might be more efficient 
Can create imbalances in 
generosity/coverage between the 
European system and other national 
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parts of a benefit system 
Lack of democratic accountability of the 
authority imposing reforms 
Conclusion: The simulation will provide two alternative approaches consistent with the 
logic of the two basic options: the harmonised unemployment benefit option will rely on 
common standards and conditionality; the reinsurance option will provide leeway for 
national governments on both fronts. 
The last table presents the pros and cons of possible solutions to two additional issues: which 
countries should participate, and how the mechanism should be funded. 
Additional issues Pros Cons 
EU28 participation Higher stabilisation capacity 
Politically more challenging  
to approve 
Euro area participation 
Easier political link to 
monetary union 
Less stabilisation capacity 
Funding by labour taxation  
Direct link between revenue 
and benefits, both 
individually and nationally 
Can increase labour tax 
wedge in countries with 
already high labour taxation 
Funding by national fiscal 
contribution 
Does not contribute to 
increasing labour tax wedge 
Does not provide the direct 
link between revenue and 
benefits 
Conclusion: The simulation will be based on the EU28 to demonstrate stabilisation 
effects for all EU economies, particularly given the ever-expanding euro area 
membership. 
The simulation will also provide two alternative approaches consistent with logic of the 
two basic options: the harmonised unemployment benefit option will rely on direct 
labour taxation; the reinsurance option will be based on general subsidy to and from 
national governments. 
 
This leads us to present simulation results for two options with two variants, or four 
scenarios in total. 
Option 1 in the simulation is the harmonised European unemployment benefit. The 
harmonised system applies automatically to every eligible unemployed person. Under our 
scenario, this joint European benefits system would have the following features: 
- It would apply to short-term unemployed workers. Our reference to unemployed 
population therefore does not include all unemployed workers, but only those that have 
been unemployed for less than one year. We set the maximum duration of benefit to 12 
months. However, our calculation is based on an average duration of six months, so we 
expect a symmetric pattern of people leaving the register. In the absence of data on 
duration profiles of the unemployed across European countries, this appeared to the best 
option. 
- The coverage ratio is set at 75%, meaning that among those unemployed for less than a 
year, three-quarters are eligible to receive benefits.  
- The benefit is equivalent to 40% of the average monthly national nominal compensation. 
It should be noted that 40% of nominal compensation is not as low as it sounds, since it is 
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calculated not from a gross wage, but from nominal compensation, which also includes 
employer social security contributions. 
Each member state would be free to set eligibility rules and replacement rates. If the cost 
were less than the formula below, the member state would receive the actual amount. If the 
cost were higher than the formula, the member state would receive an amount equivalent to 
the 75%*40% formula. This would avoid difficult-to-achieve formal harmonisation while 
ensuring that there would be de facto harmonisation, since member states would be 
incentivised to set up the system in such a way as to be close to the 75%*40% formula. In 
other words, more generous systems would be allowed, but on top of the harmonised one.  
                                                        
where U stands for unemployment and MNCE indicates the monthly nominal compensation 
per employee.  
How would be the system financed? We choose as the source of funding a dedicated labour 
taxation equivalent to 0.5% of nominal compensation. The rate was set up to roughly balance 
the system as shown in this section. 
                                           
We present two versions of this system. In the first (option 1a), the system does not require a 
country-level neutral budgetary position. In other words, countries can be permanently in 
deficit or surplus vis-à-vis the system without any corrective mechanisms. This represents a 
truly European system that essentially ignores boundaries in the fiscal sense and is able to 
redistribute resources in the event of shocks.  
We modify such a system in option 1b, in which each country needs to restore a neutral 
budgetary position. Fiscal neutrality would be achieved by doubling the contribution rate 
from 0.5% to 1% of the base for countries that have a cumulative deficit with the system of at 
least 1% of GDP. The double contribution rate would stop once the cumulative deficit falls 
below 1% of GDP. 
We call option 2 “reinsurance”. The insured entities are not single workers at risk of 
unemployment, as in option 1, but member states, or more precisely, national insurance 
funds. The basic idea is to transfer funds to finance unemployment benefits from the centre 
to the periphery when unemployment is measurably higher than normal.  
In our simulation, assistance is triggered when the unemployment rate is higher than the 
non-accelerating rate of unemployment (NAWRU) by two percentage points in a certain 
country. This choice of trigger is arbitrary and smaller values could be chosen. However, 
such a value is consistent with the idea of the reinsurance system intervening only in 
exceptional circumstances, in other words, a major increase in unemployment rates.   
The payout is a subsidy for the national budget equivalent to the sum of all unemployment 
benefits for a six-month benefit period, calculated on the same basis as option 1 (40% of 
nominal compensation, 75% of unemployed of less than one year covered). The payout 
would not be conditional; gross transfers from the EUI can be used as national governments 
see fit (though of course if conditionality were to be imposed, this would have no impact on 
the fiscal calculations that follow). 
The insurance would be funded by member state contributions. These would amount to 0.1% 
of GDP annually until 0.5% of EU GDP is accumulated. Contributions would then stop, to be 
restarted again if the fund fell under 0.5% of EU output. 
On the expenditure side, we model the following rule: if the difference between the annual 
unemployment rate and NAWRU in each country is higher than 2%, then the country in 
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question receives a payout equal to 75% of unemployed workers (under 12 months) 
multiplied by 40% of their average nominal compensation.   
                                                  
As with Option 1, we present results for two versions of this second option. In option 2a, no 
fiscal rule is applied. In other words, countries can be permanently in deficit or surplus vis-à-
vis the system without any corrective mechanisms. This represents a truly European system, 
which essentially ignores boundaries in the fiscal sense, and also a real insurance based on 
the idea that such a shock is randomly distributed.  
In option 2b, countries are required to maintain a neutral budgetary position. The system 
would aim to be balanced in the medium-to-long run for each member state. This would be 
achieved by setting an additional contribution of 0.2% of GDP payable annually by countries 
that have a cumulative deficit with the system of at least 1% of GDP. The additional 
contribution is due every year, regardless of whether the regular contribution is being paid, 
and would stop once the cumulative deficit falls below 1% of GDP. 
We compare the four combinations with regards to revenues, expenditure, annual balance 
and cumulative balance.  
We start with revenues. The left panel of the figure below shows stark differences between 
options 1 and 2. Option 2, despite an initial five-year period to build up the fund, is much 
less costly than option 1 since it is a form of ‘catastrophe’ insurance for member states, 
whereas option 1 is a form of permanent redistribution. Of course, option 1, unlike option 2, 
can replace the national schemes to some extent so this does not imply that the overall public 
revenue and expenditure in member states and the EU would be increased. It may simply be 
transferred from member states to the supranational level. 
In the 14-year period we simulate, differences between the a and b options appear to be 
relatively small for option 2 but more significant for option 1, where the need to rebalance a 
country’s relationship with the system if the accumulated deficit exceeds 1% of GDP leads to 
a more sustained increase in revenues.  
EUI revenues and expenditure under various options (% of GDP) 
Revenues Expenditure 
  
Source: Own elaboration based on AMECO data.  
Expenditure does not differ between options a and b, as the difference is on the revenue side. 
Therefore, we can only compare expenditure overall under options 1 and 2. What we can see 
in the right panel of the figure above is the same as in the revenue panel, only more 
pronounced. The reinsurance option essentially lies dormant (helping an individual member 
state here and there) until the Great Recession, when it kicks into action. Expenditure for 
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option 1 is also effectively anti-cyclical at the EU level – expenditure ranges from 0.25% of 
GDP to 0.4%, but it has a baseline component that distributes significant amounts, even at 
the best of times.  
The most complicated figure so far is the comparison of annual balances. In good times, 
options 1 and 2 are both neutral, as assistance to individual countries is not sufficiently large 
to significantly influence the overall system balance. The only exception is the initial build-
up of funding under option 2. However, in difficult times after 2009, both options initially go 
into deep deficit in 2009. After this, their reactions differ. At one end of the range, option 2b 
quickly regains balance at the EU level, while at the other end, option 1a continues with a 
deficit of 0.05% to 0.1% of GDP until 2012. Therefore, the desirability of the various options 
at the EU level also depends on what policy-makers consider to be a preferable approach. 
EUI annual and cumulative balance of the EU under various options (% of GDP) 
Annual balance Cumulative balance 
  
Source: Own elaboration based on AMECO data. 
Different annual balances also translate into different cumulative balances. For option 2, the 
differences between 2a and 2b lead to a small cumulative difference. The real difference 
occurs between options 1 and 2, where option 1 goes into cumulative deficit, which becomes 
a system-wide deficit under both 1a and 1b by 2012 (though the b option, by increasing 
revenue, results in a much smaller deficit). The calibration of various options is only an 
illustration, of course, but it shows that for option 1, policy-makers would need to have a 
financial backstopping facility of some kind (e.g. an extraordinary contribution or loans). 
We also present a range of estimates of stabilisation effects of the European 
unemployment insurance system. We present the estimates for national episodes of major 
distress that are sufficient to trigger assistance under both options. We use a simple estimate 
of the stabilisation effect: every year starting from 2008, we multiply the net inflow coming 
from the EUI fund by a fiscal multiplier. The rationale is that this allows us to calculate the 
value added of the European mechanism if it had existed at the time. We propose the 
calculation only for major shocks1 because for minor shocks, the shock absorption value is 
non-existent; national governments are more than able to weather them on their own. This 
does not exclude other rationales for creating an EUI, even for minor shocks (as presented by 
the harmonised unemployment insurance system compared with the reinsurance).  
                                                     
1 We consider a downturn that results in an unemployment rate higher than 2%+ the country’s 
NAWRU as a major shock. 
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Since we look at episodes of major distress, the net inflow during such episodes is identical 
for the harmonised and the reinsurance options. Therefore, we do not show differences 
between options 1 (the harmonised scheme) and 2 (the reinsurance scheme), because they 
produce identical results in our simulation. Given our strong preference for it, we consider 
the case of a fiscal rule that allows deficit and surpluses each year, with the obligation to 
restore fiscal balance over the cycle. Calculations are showed in the table below.  
Example of stabilisation effect of the EUI during the Great Recession, selected countries 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 SUM 
Estonia 0.00 1.15 0.89 -0.15 -0.15 1.74 
Greece 0.00 0.00 -0.15 0.81 0.95 1.60 
Ireland  0.00 0.85 0.55 0.41 0.37 2.19 
Latvia 0.00 1.34 0.86 0.20 0.19 2.59 
Lithuania 0.00 1.09 0.60 0.21 0.14 2.04 
Spain 0.00 1.79 1.54 1.26 1.49 6.08 
Source: Authors. 
We start with the case of Spain, which has been in the limelight during this crisis due to 
skyrocketing unemployment figures. The net inflow, multiplied by the fiscal multiplier of 
unemployment benefits, generates an additional output equal to 13 to 19 billion euros every 
year starting from 2009. This is equal to between 1.3% and 1.8% of GDP. Another interesting 
case is that of the Baltic countries, where the combined effect of the EUI funds and their 
(assumed) multiplier is slightly above 1% of GDP in 2009. However, compared to Spain, it 
declines faster due to the faster recovery of the three economies.  In Greece, the European 
mechanism kicks in later due to the deterioration of the NAWRU that accompanies the 
increase in unemployment. The total impact on the economy over the entire recession (up to 
2012) is 1.6% of GDP. Finally, in Ireland, the EUI funds are provided between 2009 and 2011 
and, combined with their multiplier effect, generate an additional output equal to between 
0.4% and 0.9% every year.  
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1. Introduction  
This report was commissioned by the European Parliament as one of the analytical resources 
to be used in discussion of the possible creation and shape of European-level unemployment 
insurance.  
Specifically, the Terms of Reference for the study stated:  
“The current economic crisis has revealed inside the Euro-zone deficiencies and/or 
inadequacies in social safety net and more specifically that national unemployment schemes 
are jeopardized in the current crisis, not allowing them to play their counter-cyclical role. 
Against this background and following the hearing organized by the Employment and Social 
Affairs Committee on 9 July 2013, the European Parliament has decided to commission a 
research paper on the Cost of Non-Europe (CoNE) of the absence of a minimum 
unemployment allowance. The basic concept arises from the idea that if a member state is 
affected by slower growth for a period then, it is likely to have higher unemployment. Further 
problems are likely to arise since a prolonged crisis inevitably implies that an increasing 
number of people will be long-term unemployed. If the funding of the compensation paid to 
unemployment workers is Euro zone wide than, it is more likely that it comes from the more 
prosperous areas and better off citizens. It is thus a redistributive tool that could contribute to 
stabilisation. However at this stage several questions remain open namely; the extent, the 
coverage, the replacement rate the funding, and the access conditions to a minimum 
unemployment allowance, (just to mention few of them) and need to be clarified.” 
The scope of the paper is as follows: “Analyse the basic characteristics of the unemployment 
benefits in EU MS, ascertain what are the prospects of introducing an unemployment 
insurance scheme for the Euro-zone; presenting in details the institutional dimensions of 
such instrument and, developing a simulation exercise (based on the information and data 
available the contractor will present at least three scenarios)”. 
The resulting paper was drafted between November 2013 and February 2014 and is 
structured in three parts:  
Chapter 2 analyses briefly the existing situation, including a summary of the existing US 
unemployment insurance systems and a list of existing proposals for the European system. 
Chapter 3 outlines the main trade-offs and challenges in designing such a system Chapter 4 
then presents results of our simulation of four scenarios  
Additionally, the paper contains an executive summary, introduction and bibliography. 
Given the existence of several high-quality studies of the existing situation and even of the 
trade-offs and challenges in designing a new European system (including, but not limited to, 
several excellent papers commissioned by the European Commission), we decided to focus 
on practical simulation. Therefore, chapter 4 makes up the bulk of the paper and chapters 2 
and 3 are as succinct as possible. 
2. Current situation 
The objective of this chapter is to analyse what exists in European countries in terms of 
unemployment benefits. We map the situation based on four main characteristics and we 
compare this with the situation in the United States. We discover that a high level of 
heterogeneity exists in Europe as a result of different durations, coverage ratios and 
replacement rates. As a result, expenditure varied on average over the period 2005-2011 
between 0.2% and 2.1% of national outputs.  
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We also map measures that exist at the supranational level, specifically the European level, 
in terms of both harmonisation of different systems and policies implemented by the EU. 
Our conclusion is that the existing attempts of the Council of Europe to coordinate automatic 
stabilisers or funds managed by the EU are of a much smaller scope than the idea of creating 
a European unemployment insurance system.  
2.1 Brief summary of national systems 
Unemployment insurance schemes exist in one way or another in all European countries. 
However, no one could claim that Europe is united on this front, since as soon as one starts 
looking at figures, large differences emerge between national frameworks. To understand 
these differences, we look at the four main characteristics of unemployment insurance 
schemes:  
- Coverage ratios, meaning the share of unemployed workers covered by the insurance. 
- Coverage levels, expressed as income replacement ratios, which is the share of the 
previous wage provided by the system.  
- Duration, normally in terms of weeks or months. 
- Eligibility requirements, often expressed in numbers of weeks/months of contributions 
to the common fund.  
As shown in this section, a great level of variation exists in Europe for each characteristic. 
This is not the only source of diversity since, as a consequence of the different mixes, 
expenditure on income support varies, together with the organisation of the insurance.  
2.1.1 Design 
Coverage ratios 
Coverage ratios are defined as the percentage share of unemployed workers covered by the 
insurance. If in principle this is a simple measure, in practice no unequivocal numbers exist 
due to the different definitions of benefits and unemployment in different surveys.  
Taking the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) as a 
reference, it has been estimated that among euro area countries, more than two-thirds of 
workers are covered by the insurance in five countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France 
and Germany. In Greece, Italy, Slovenia and Slovenia, by contrast, only one-third of 
unemployed workers are entitled to receive benefits. The remaining countries are distributed 
somewhere in between one- and two-thirds (EC, 2013).   
Coverage ratios estimated via the Labour Force Survey have a downward bias compared to 
EU-SILC, but leave the ranking of countries practically unchanged (EC, 2013). 
Income replacement rates 
The level of income protection is defined in most EU member states as a percentage of the 
previous (gross)2 wage, with percentages often being higher for lower earners. The reference 
period for this calculation also differs across countries, ranging from 3 to 24 months (EC, 
2013).   
                                                     
2 In three euro area countries (Austria, Finland and Germany) the net is used. In Ireland and Malta, it 
is a flat rate.  
10  BEBLAVÝ & MASELLI 
According to European Commission estimates, taking as a reference a single person earning 
an average wage, gross replacement rates can range from 20% in the UK and Malta to more 
than 70% in Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Slovenia, but with rates in most 
countries in the range of 40% to 60%. 
Table 1. Gross replacement rates (GRR) 
GRR < 40% Austria Ireland Malta   
40% < GRR< 60% Slovakia Spain Germany Finland Cyprus 
 Estonia Belgium Greece Italy France 
GRR > 60% Netherlands Portugal Luxembourg Slovenia  
Source: European Commission (2013).  
Duration  
The lowest durations are in Slovakia and Malta, which ensure benefits for no more than six 
months. Still below one year are Austria and Cyprus (7 months), Italy (8), Ireland and Greece 
(10), and Portugal (11). The duration reaches 12 months in Estonia, Germany, Luxemburg 
and Slovenia, 17 in Finland, and 24 in Spain and France. It goes up to 38 months in the 
Netherlands and it is unlimited in Belgium (EC, 2013).  
Eligibility 
In order to be entitled to the benefit, the unemployed worker needs to contribute to the 
insurance during time in employment. This qualifying period is often expressed in terms of 
months of contribution over a reference period. Both vary greatly between EU countries, 
ranging from 6 months of contribution over the previous 24 in the UK to 12 months over the 
previous 18 in Belgium. Aside from Belgium, the countries that are very strict on this ground 
include the Netherlands, Slovakia, Poland and Latvia. At the opposite end of the scale, 
alongside the UK, are Spain, Ireland and France.  
2.1.2 Financing and expenditure 
The unemployment benefits system originated as an insurance to protect workers’ income 
from the risk of unemployment due to the business cycle. In almost all European countries, 
the contribution to the system is split between the employer and the employee. Only in 
Denmark is the cost entirely borne by the insured, while in the Czech Republic, Lithuania 
and Poland it is entirely financed by the employer (EC, 2013). In most cases, such 
contributions turn out not to be sufficient to cover the expenditure on benefits, and therefore 
the state intervenes to subsidise the system or to cover the deficits. This happens in all 
countries, with the exception of Estonia, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Bulgaria and 
Hungary, where no role is foreseen for the state.    
All elements summed up, out-of-work income maintenance support (as officially recorded 
by Eurostat) amounts to slightly more than 1% of GDP in the EU, with obvious variations 
due to the cycle. Once more, the average is hardly representative of the member countries, 
since expenditure can constitute less than 0.5% of GDP (in Slovakia, Poland, the UK, 
Lithuania, Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Romania) or more than 1.5% (in the Netherlands, 
Ireland and Spain).   
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Figure 1. Out-of-work income maintenance and support, as % of GDP (average 2005-2011) 
 
Source: Eurostat.  
2.2 Coordination of existing national systems 
Given the large variation across national systems, one of the few fields where no attempt has 
been made in the past to reach a level of harmonisation is passive labour markets policies for 
the unemployed. Yet a form of coordination exists, even though it exclusively originates 
from the need to facilitate cross-country mobility and therefore de facto affects only a small 
share of workers in Europe.   
The degree of social security coordination between the different national systems at the 
European level is one of the key determinants of intra-EU labour migration. The EU 
regulation on the coordination of national systems and the European Social Charter 
contribute most in this regard at the European level.  
2.2.1 EU regulation on the coordination of national systems 
The coordination of national unemployment benefits is organised via a subsection within 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems.  The aim of the 
provision in the Regulation is to improve the standard of living and conditions of 
employment through the simplification and advancement of the free movement of persons. 
Earlier, in 1971, the Council Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 had been put in place to ensure 
equivalent treatment and protection of social security benefits of all EU workers, irrespective 
of current residence in the EU and the employment. The new Regulation is built on the 
fundament of the previous Council Regulation of 1971.  
The Regulation does not transfer directly any powers from the national to the supranational 
level, as it bases its influence on Article 308 TEC (now 352 TFEU). The Regulation was aimed 
at amending the nationally determined social benefit entitlements or the condition under 
which they are granted within each domestic framework, thus leaving domestic systems 
intact. Various divisions of the social security system are covered, among them the 
unemployment benefits claimable within an EU member state. The provisions in the 
Regulation state that periods of employment spent in one EU member state need to be taken 
into account when the person moves to another EU member state and thereby switches to 
another national social security system. The applicable legislation is that of the member state 
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in which in person is pursuing ‘a gainful activity’. With regard to unemployment insurance, 
this means that the member state whose system the person is currently paying into or 
receiving benefits from must allow for the periods of insurance and the duration of 
employment (whether regular employment or self-employment) that they have 
accomplished in other EU member states “as though they were completed under the 
legislation it applies”.  
Furthermore, if a previously insured person becomes unemployed, thus having claims on 
unemployment benefits, and is applying for jobs in another member state, that person has 
the right to move to the other member state to facilitate the application while retaining his 
claim on unemployment benefit entitlements from the member state of his/her previous 
employment for a minimum of three months, which can be extended to six months if the 
institutions in charge deem it appropriate. The regulation only applies if the total entitlement 
period has not been exceeded during the job-seeking time spend abroad.  In any case, after 
the imparted three-to six-months grace period, the claim is no longer valid should the person 
not return to the member state in which s/he is entitled to unemployment benefits.  
Generally, all employment benefits are claimed from the institution of the country where the 
person has worked last and was residing. This regulation is targeted to the needs of ‘frontier 
workers’ who regularly cross the border, and prevents burden-shifting among neighbouring 
states. This rule only applies to full unemployment, as partial unemployed is dealt with in 
the country where the part-time work is carried out. 
The regulation also applies, besides to EU member states, to the EFTA countries: Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. In the annex to the regulation, several references to 
predating bilateral agreements that need to honoured and specific acts with regard to 
individual countries are made; however, these must not impede the framework described 
above.  
Since the start of the Great Recession, in particular, such regulation has raised fears among 
policy-makers of the possibility to exploit the system, thereby giving rise to the so-called 
‘welfare tourism’ debate. The truth is that the fear of social welfare tourism with regard to 
unemployment benefits is very limited, since a person is only entitled to the benefits that 
he/she has accumulated in the unemployment insurance fund in the country of 
employment. The fact that previous periods of work in another country are taken into 
account does not pose a significant threat to the social system of the last hosting country, 
since the person has to have obtained a job in the host country before making a claim 
thereafter. Hence, simply moving to another country without work will not induce transfers 
based on unemployment benefits.  
There is of course the possibility to create a dummy firm or fake employment which could 
entitle ‘labour’ migrants to unemployment benefits, though the risk is low as they would 
have to show income to be entitled to a percentage of their previous salary. Job-seeking 
abroad for the period of three (theoretically possible to extend to six) months could create an 
incentive to cash in on purchasing power differences, i.e. a euro spent in Luxembourg has 
less purchasing power than in Latvia. However, overall studies have not clearly shown 
substantial welfare tourism within in the EU (Guild et al., 2013). Jobseekers are more likely to 
stay where they have already settled down or move to a region where they intend to find 
employment rather than where their purchasing power is maximised for the next three 
months.  
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2.2.2 Other European systems of unemployment benefit coordination 
European Code of Social Security 
The European Code of Social Security was initiated as early as 1949 and was highly 
influenced by the Social Security Minimum Standards (Convention No. 102) published by 
the International Labour Organization (ILO) in 1950. It is a product of the Council of Europe 
and therefore not part of the acquis communautaire. After years of negotiations, the ‘code’ was 
adopted by the Council of Ministers in 1964 and came into force two years later. The aim of 
the code and its protocol was to protect the minimum standards of social security that must 
be adhered to within the signatory countries. The duration and quality of social benefits are 
regulated in terms of the minimum, but each signatory can decide what services or extended 
durations that country provides in excess of the minimum. The protocol sets these minimum 
standards in a manner which allows the individual signatory to maintain the specificities it 
has taken to fit national circumstances.  
With regard to unemployment benefits (Article 19-24), the code defines the conditions under 
which the person whose contract has been terminated is entitled to unemployment benefits 
and it further states that benefits should be paid in periodical cash transfers. The protocol 
explicitly mentions that at least 50% of all employees must be covered by the insurance 
system in place. The code further emphasises that a jobseeker (whose wages have previously 
been suspended) is entitled to unemployment benefits if she/he has been unable to find 
“suitable” work. The minimum duration was set at 13 weeks during any 12-month period in 
the original code, but was enhanced to 21 weeks in the Addendum 2 of 2008. Overall, the 
code introduces an absolute minimum while leaving room for interpretation on issues such 
as “suitable work”, thus circumventing firm restriction with regard to details for domestic 
policy-makers. 
The European Social Charter 
The European Social Charter, introduced through the Council of Europe Treaty, is another 
example of an instrument coordinating unemployment benefits and protecting social as well 
as human rights. The Treaty was introduced in 1961 but amended in 1996 and came into 
force in 1999. The revised Charter guards the right to social security, including benefit 
systems, which must not be discriminatory to any part of society. The Charter itself sets the 
framework within which unemployment insurance functions. Article 12 postulates the right 
to social security in general and making reference to the European Code of Social Security as 
“to maintain the social security system at a satisfactory level at least equal to that necessary 
for the ratification of the European Code of Social Security”. The relevant Article 24 deals 
with the rights of employees in the case of termination of employment, but it does not 
specify any requirements to be made in case of unemployment beside the reference to the 
European Code of Social Security. Complaints against violations can be brought before a 
special committee evaluating the alleged infringements.   
2.3 European funds 
The Structural and Cohesion Funds represent the main financial instruments to foster 
economic, social and territorial cohesion in the EU.  
One fund is particularly important when it comes to measures related to the labour market – 
the European Social Fund (ESF), which is based on multi-annual programmes. Among the 
‘special instruments’ – outside the multi-annual programming routine – the European 
Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF) was recently set up. These more flexible mechanisms 
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are intended to enable the EU to mobilise the necessary funds to react to unforeseen events, 
such as crisis and emergency situations.3 
EGF and ESF measures are sometimes used to complement each other. While the EGF 
provides tailor-made assistance to redundant workers in response to a specific, large-scale 
redundancy event, the ESF supports strategic, long-term goals (e.g. increasing human capital 
or managing change).4  
The two funds therefore do not try to create an income support system for the unemployed, 
but rather to create complementary activation measures such as training, job-search 
assistance and occupational guidance.  
European Social Fund 
The ESF represents over 10% of the total EU budget. For the period 2007 to 2013, the ESF 
budget amounted to €75 billion, or close to €10 billion per year. 
The ESF supports a number of actions to enhance access to employment such as (ESF Expert 
Evaluation Network, Final Synthesis Report on Access to employment, October 2012):    
o the modernisation and strengthening of labour market institutions, in particular 
employment services; 
o the implementation of active and preventive measures ensuring the early identification 
of needs with individual action plans and personalised support, such as tailored training, 
job search, outplacement and mobility, self employment and business creation; and 
o specific action to increase the participation of migrants and reduce gender-based 
segregation. 
ESF funding is available through the member states and regions. ESF programmes are 
implemented through individual projects run by participating organisations, such as public 
administrations, companies, NGOs and social partners active in the field of employment and 
social inclusion (European Commission, 2012). 
In the next period (2014 to 2020), the ESF will continue to be the main EU instrument for 
investing in human capital. 
European Globalisation Adjustment Fund  
The EGF is one of the special instruments not included in the EU’s multi-annual financial 
framework, with a maximum total amount from January 2014 to 31 December 2020 of €3 
billion. It may not exceed a maximum annual amount of €429 million. The EGF was initially 
established for the duration of the programming period 2007 to 2013 
“to provide the Union with an instrument to demonstrate solidarity with, and give 
support to, workers made redundant as a result of major structural changes in world 
trade patterns caused by globalisation where these redundancies have a significant 
adverse impact on the regional or local economy.”5 
                                                     
3 http://ec.europa.eu/budget/mff/introduction/index_en.cfm 
4 COM (2011) 608 final. 
5 COM(2011) 608 final. 
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The EGF co-funds active labour market policy measures that aim to facilitate the re-
integration of workers in areas, sectors, territories or labour markets suffering the shock of 
serious economic disruption.6  
The Council and the European Parliament have recently agreed for the EGF to continue in 
the 2014-2020 period (European Commission, 2013). 
The EGF shall apply to applications by the member states for financial contributions to be 
provided to workers made redundant mostly: 
o as a result of major structural changes in world trade patterns due to globalisation; or 
o as a result of a serious disruption of the local, regional or national economy caused by an 
unexpected crisis. 
Until 2009 the threshold for the number of redundancies required to trigger access to the 
EGF was 1,000. This number has now been reduced to 500. This amendment was welcomed 
due to the particular features of countries where the industrial structure is composed of 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (GHK, 2011). 
The measures financed under the EGF may include in particular:7  
a) job-search assistance, occupational guidance, advisory services, mentoring,  
outplacement assistance, entrepreneurship promotion, aid for self-employment  and 
business start-up or for changing or adjusting activity (including  investments in physical 
assets), co-operation activities, tailor-made training and  re-training, including 
information and communication technology skills and certification of acquired 
experience;   
b) special time-limited measures, such as job-search allowances, employers’ recruitment 
incentives, mobility allowances, subsistence or training allowances (including allowances 
for carers or farm relief services), all of which are limited to the duration of the 
documented active job search or life-long learning or  training activities;  
c) measures to stimulate disadvantaged or older workers to remain in or return to the 
labour market. 
Since its creation in 2007, the EGF has dealt with a total of 110 cases. Spain is the country that 
has requested EGF assistance for the greatest number of workers, followed by Italy, 
Germany and Ireland.  
Table 2. EGF: Number of applications received, 2007–13 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013* 
 8 5 28 29 24 10 6 
* Note: up to 12 August 2013. 
Source: EC 2014. 
How important are the two funds?  
As previously shown, the two funds together constitute more than 10% of the EU budget. 
But what is their incidence in member state economies? Two observations can be made in 
terms of size. The first is that the ESF and the EGF are hardly comparable. Even in Estonia, 
which is the country that has benefited the most from the EGF, the aid provided by the fund 
                                                     
6 COM(2011) 608 final. 
7 COM(2011) 608 final. 
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amounts to only 0.01% of GDP. Therefore, even though it may be very useful in dealing with 
micro adjustments and providing relevant support for a local economy, in macroeconomic 
terms it has a minor impact.  
The ESF, on the other hand, not only has a longer tradition but also greater firepower. As 
indicated in Table 3, funds can go up as high as 0.78% of GDP8 (as in the case of Portugal 
during the last budget period).   
Yet, the ESF cannot be considered a stabilising tool. As a matter of fact, it serves the opposite 
purpose: it is used to finance supply-side measures for the labour market, such as active 
labour market policies and job centres, and therefore it is meant to improve the functioning 
of the labour market in the long run. 
Table 3. European Social and Globalisation Adjustment Funds  
  ESF allocated (2007-2013) EGF allocated (2007-2011) 
 Million euros % of GDP Million euros % of GDP 
Czech Republic 4,451 0.43 0.3 0.00  
Estonia 461 0.41 7 0.01  
Ireland 750 0.06 10.1 0.00  
Greece 5,133 0.34 2.9 0.00  
Spain 11,271 0.15 43.7 0.00  
Italy 14,475 0.13 66.2 0.00  
Poland 11,773 0.47 400.3 0.00  
Portugal 9,245 0.78 1.2 0.00  
Romania 4,334 0.48 3.2 0.00  
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/esf/main.jsp?catId=443&langId=en and EGF statistical portrait, p. 69.  
2.4 The US system of unemployment insurance  
The US federal unemployment compensation (UC) programme provides income support to 
workers that lose their jobs for up to a maximum of 26 weeks in most states. Approximately 
130 million jobs are covered by the programme. As at the end of the week 17 August 2013, 
2.9 million unemployed workers were receiving unemployment compensation with an 
average weekly compensation of $307. Estimated expenditure on regular unemployment 
benefits in 2014 amounts to $40.5 billion (Whittaker and Isaacs, 2013).  
In the case of severe recessions and consequent high unemployment in a state, extended 
benefits can be launched, funded 50% by the state and 50% by the federal government (and 
exceptionally 100% by the federal government in the 2009 stimulus package).   
The US system constitutes an obvious point of comparison for the potential European 
system, given that the UC centralises part of the organisation but still allows each state the 
possibility to personalise certain features and requirements.  
The UC is in fact a joint federal-state programme financed by federal taxes under the Federal 
Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) and by state payroll taxes under the State Unemployment 
Tax Acts (SUTA). The FUTA tax rate for employers is 6% of labour cost, but a credit of 5.4% 
                                                     
8 The allocated budget for 2007-2013 is divided by the cumulated GDP over the same period.  
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is granted for employers coming from states that have a national system in place, which is all 
US states. The provision served as an incentive for all states to create an insurance, as it 
constituted a minimum floor for employers coming from every state.  
Most businesses are subject to state and federal unemployment taxes. An estimated $6.7 
billion in federal unemployment taxes (FUTA) and $44.47 billion in state unemployment 
taxes (SUTA) should have been collected in FY2011 (Whittaker and Isaacs, 2011). Part of the 
former is used by each state to cover the administrative costs of its system and the other part 
finances the extended benefits when needed. It is worth noting that the employers’ 
contribution is subject to experience ratings; firms that fire more also pay more.  
Unlike in most European countries, the US version of an unemployment insurance scheme is 
therefore fully financed by employers. The mechanism is based on the principle that those 
that fire more also need to contribute more to the fund. For the firms’ side of the labour 
market, although not perfect, the system is organised as insurance: companies need to 
provide severance payment to workers and in order to do that, insure themselves against the 
risk of firing a certain number of workers (see Box 1). The same is not true for employees 
who do not contribute to the fund. From their point of view, the benefits rather qualify as 
social assistance in the form of income protection. 
The system is administered by the US Department of Labor (DOL). Federal law sets broad 
rules that the state programmes must follow, including the broad categories of workers that 
must be covered by the programme, the method for triggering the Extended Benefit (EB) and 
Emergency Unemployment Compensation 2008 (EUC08) programmes, the highest state 
unemployment tax rate to be imposed on employers (5.4%), and how the states will repay 
Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF) loans. If the states do not follow these rules, their 
employers may lose a portion of their state unemployment tax credit when their federal 
income tax is calculated. The federal tax pays for both federal and state administrative costs, 
the federal share of the EB programme, loans to insolvent state UC accounts, and state 
employment services (Whittaker and Isaacs, 2011). 
Table 4. Revenue and expenditure associated with unemployment compensation, FY2001 – FY2011 
 
Source: Whittaker and Isaacs (2011b). 
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Maximum benefit levels vary enormously, from $133 per week in Puerto Rico to $625 in 
Massachusetts.9 States can obtain loans from the Federal Unemployment Account should 
they run low on funds, but the deficit needs to be cleared in the long run.  
How was the system created? The origin of the system dates back to the mid-1930s. The 
Great Depression had made it clear that an income support mechanism was necessary, and a 
number of states started to investigate and make proposals in this direction. The main 
obstacle, however, remained the employers’ fear of losing competitiveness with respect to 
neighbouring states. This made the intervention at the federal level necessary. Witte (1936) 
explains that 
“[T]hroughout the history of the unemployment compensation provisions of the 
Social Security Act, there was general agreement regarding the necessity for federal 
legislation. It was recognized by everyone who believed in the desirability of 
unemployment insurance that little headway could be made unless employers in all 
states would be subject to the same (or substantially the same) costs, whether their 
respective states enacted unemployment insurance laws or not.” 
 
Box 1. Experience rating 
Unemployment insurance in the US is financed via a tax for employers that amounts to 5.4% of 
labour cost. The tax is not a fixed amount for each employer, however, since those that tend to 
fire less also pay less. This is called “experience rating” and is based on the idea that the 
existence of unemployment insurance reduces the cost of firing and therefore an instrument is 
needed to eliminate the perverse incentive of increasing the number of redundant workers 
(Mongrain and Roberts, 2004).  
Experience rating is said to be perfect when firms pay the full cost of their layoffs. The type 
applied in the US is imperfect since lower and upper bounds exist, meaning that firms that are 
less volatile in terms of employment end up subsidising the more volatile firms (Wang and 
Williamson, 2002).  
The tax is based on a formula and each US state is free to decide how to apply it. In more than 
half of states, this is based on the reserve ratio. The second most common formula applied is 
the benefit ratio.  
The reserve ratio is the ratio between the company’s unemployment insurance account 
(contributions paid minus benefits) and total gross wages. The reserve is cumulative over the 
lifetime of the company, whereas total wages refer to the last three years. As a result, the tax 
increases when more unemployed workers receive the benefit and decreases when higher 
contributions are paid into the fund. The benefit ratio is the ratio of benefits divided by total 
payrolls over the past three years; the more benefits are withdrawn by unemployed workers, 
the higher the tax for the employer.  
The concept of experience rating is also applied at the national level: in case of a lack of 
liquidity, a state can borrow from the federal funds. States are charged interest on loans that 
are not repaid by the end of the fiscal year in which they were obtained. States facing troubles 
in financing their own insurance can therefore ask for help from the federal fund, but only in 
the form of a loan that needs to be repaid based on an agreement with the US Secretary of 
Labour. If the firm fails to restore the balance between revenues and expenditure of national 
funds in the medium run, the federal authority can raise firms’ contribution.   
                                                     
9 2011 data.  
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Can the US system be a model for Europe?  
A major concern related to the creation of a European unemployment insurance system is the 
incentive for people to move to collect benefits in more generous countries, so-called welfare 
mobility or welfare tourism. Does it happen in the US, where a strong incentive to do just 
that is provided by the large dispersion in the weekly benefit granted by different states? In 
other words, can an unemployed Texan worker collect benefits in Massachusetts, where 
he/she can receive up to $674 per week? The eligibility rules of the Massachusetts 
government explicitly state that “if you worked in another state, you should apply for 
unemployment insurance in that state“.10 There are residency requirements in place in 
individual states, though as far as we were able to tell, there is no federal requirement. 
However, given the shape of the US system, states have incentives not to attract unemployed 
recipients of the benefit. 
One of the added values of the federal system lies in the possibility to extend benefits 
exceptionally in the event of severe recessions in one or more states, i.e. when the 
stabilisation tool is most needed. This happens via the extended and emergency benefits, 
with the former partially and the latter completely financed at the federal level. Extended 
benefits are the geographical redistributive part of the system.  
Figure 2. Total unemployment insurance benefits paid by month and type of programme in the US  
 
Source: Boushey and Eizenga (2011).  
If in principle the rule constitutes a safe back-up for a system that is not very generous (at 
least compared to European standards), this is something that could hardly be implemented 
in a European context. The reason is that such extensions require quick decision-making, 
which is more difficult to implement in Europe given the multi-level governance and the 
necessity to apply a subsidiarity principle.    
A less remarked upon but interesting aspect of the US system is its capacity to strike a 
balance vis-à-vis individual states over the cycle: each state can indeed borrow from the 
federal cash pot in hard times, but these remain as loans and as such need to be returned. 
This in principle ensures that the objective of stabilising income when most needed is not 
missed, but at the same time avoids free-riding. If a state is unable to repay the loan, the 
employers’ contribution is automatically raised. This is what happened recently in 
                                                     
10 http://www.massresources.org/unemployment-eligibility.html 
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California, for example, where the fund currently runs a deficit of almost $10 billion 
(Employment Development Department, 2013). 
All in all, the US system is particularly interesting, not only for the comparability of its 
labour market to the European market in terms of size and skills levels, but even more so 
because of its mix of three compromises/results: 
- The stabilisation capacity based on short-term support, combined with the possibility for 
each state to borrow from the central cash pot, if necessary.  
- The creation of a common minimum standard, not in terms of provision where each state 
is free to set its optimal level of protection, but in terms of employers’ contribution 
necessary to finance the policy.  
- The experience rating, which punishes companies that fire more.  
2.5 Potential economic, political and social rationale for EU action on 
unemployment benefits 
The purpose of unemployment insurance is, from a purely economic point of view, to 
provide a counter-cyclical stabilisation mechanism to the economy, and from a social point 
of view, to alleviate the pain of unemployment by providing income security. Economic 
theory suggests that higher insurance can increase wages and extend the unemployment 
spell by raising the reservation wage, which is the lowest wage rate at which a worker would 
accept a job. Empirical evidence suggests that the exact design of such policy matters, in 
particular how benefits decrease with duration and to what extent they are complemented 
by active labour market policies (Blanchard et al., 2013). The exact design is important from 
the microeconomic point of view, but what about the macroeconomic aspects? In a monetary 
union especially, they are at least as important to justify the adoption of such policy.  
Three considerations are important in an international-macro perspective: 
- the coordination issue; 
- fiscal constraints; and 
- the trigger of the policy symmetric and asymmetric shocks.  
To the purely economic considerations, one needs to add the political and social concerns: 
the existence of a form of European solidarity and redistribution within the continent.  
2.5.1 The economic theory 
(A)symmetric shocks and coordination failures 
Problems arise in a monetary union when an asymmetric shock occurs. A textbook case is 
provided by De Grauwe (2007): an asymmetric demand shock – negative in France and 
positive in Germany. As a consequence, unemployment increases in the former and goes 
down in the latter. Two mechanisms can potentially lead to automatic re-equilibration: wage 
flexibility and mobility of labour.  
How does unemployment insurance interfere with each? Will it facilitate or hinder wage 
flexibility and labour mobility? Would this change if such insurance is organised at the 
European level?     
In principle, an unemployment insurance scheme will hamper both adjustment mechanisms. 
The benefit will keep the reservation wage at a certain level, higher or lower depending on 
the replacement rate. The national unemployment insurance will also limit cross-country 
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mobility: it lowers the incentive to look for a job in general, but even more so in another 
country because the unemployed workers may need to give up their benefits.  
The latter problem would be solved should a European system be in place: unemployed 
workers could collect the benefits independently of the country in which they are looking for 
a job. With regard to the first issue – the reservation wage – it does not matter for the 
adjustment in the recession country whether the benefit is paid at the national or European 
level.  
But how likely are asymmetric shocks in Europe? The academic literature gives the 
impression that this is a steady issue in Europe. The differences in the European economies 
(different specialisation of production, different labour market regulations, different 
demographics, different national level macroeconomic policies, etc.) make economies react 
differently to external shocks. Asymmetric shocks therefore seem to be a matter of regularity, 
and it is only the significance of these shocks that varies. 
The OECD (2010: 72) underlines that recent asymmetric shocks in Europe were mainly 
attributable to the catching-up processes of certain economies. However, there are still 
considerable differences between economies that could easily cause new imbalances. Even 
though the common currency has increased integration, there remain many potential sources 
of asymmetric shocks. These could be different demographic developments, asymmetric 
production trends, remaining inequalities in the regulation and flexibility of wages and 
prices, or differences in employment protection. The OECD therefore recommends the euro 
area-wide coordination of such issues, or far-reaching structural reforms that may lower the 
risk of asymmetric shocks. 
In a recent publication from the IMF (Allard et al., 2013), the authors argue that booms and 
busts occur very regularly in an unequal pattern across Europe and that this dispersion of 
national specific growth is not really showing a tendency to approach a common European 
level.  
De Grauwe (2013) observes that while monetary policy has been centralised, the rest of the 
macroeconomic policies have remained in national hands, 
“producing idiosyncratic movements unconstrained by the existence of a common 
currency. Hence, there are few policy options to bring national booms and busts into 
line with any kind of European development. Even worse, the common interest rate 
that may be too low for booming countries and too high for countries in recession 
even exacerbates asymmetric developments. Therefore, at first the convergence 
process in Europe has to be finished. And already that process appears to be 
asymmetric itself.”  
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Figure 3. Country-specific shocks in the euro area   
 
Source: Allard et al. (2013). 
The case of symmetric shocks is more straightforward and poses fewer challenges to policy-
makers. In case of recession, the main decision to be taken is whether to use the fiscal or 
monetary stimulus, or a combination of the two. Yet, because of the specific nature of 
Europe’s construction, suboptimal equilibria can be also reached because the former is 
decided at national level and the latter by a supranational institution – the ECB – with an 
independent mandate. An EMU-wide (or eurozone-wide) unemployment insurance scheme 
could therefore solve the coordination problem by relying on an automatic stabiliser.  
Budget constraints  
Together with the risk of asymmetric shocks and coordination failures, a third 
macroeconomic argument may point to the need for EU/EMU-wide automatic stabilisers: 
tough budget constraints.  
The euro area crisis showed that risk premia on sovereign debt can diverge significantly. 
Starting from 2010, it became not only difficult but also very expensive for sovereigns in the 
periphery of Europe to borrow on the market. High interest rates therefore make the 
financing of public expenditure, which can easily include expenditure on labour market 
policies in times of high unemployment rates very expensive. A government that faces tough 
fiscal constraints may consequently be faced with the choice of cutting income support 
measures at a time when they are needed most, that is, when unemployment is soaring and 
vacancies are limited. Moreover there is a possibility for large shocks to become self-
sustaining through pro-cyclical fiscal policy and a negative feedback loop. Backstopping 
national systems could be a way of preventing such a feedback loop from developing. 
The creation a supranational fund (in whatever form), whereby countries and/or workers 
and employers contribute during good times, could avoid such a trap. In this case, the 
funding of passive labour market policies would come from a supranational authority and 
would therefore not be a burden on the national budgets, as countries would have to 
contribute to it only during upswings. 
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2.5.2 Political and social rationale  
Demonstrating European solidarity in a visible and tangible way for EU citizens 
The crisis and its aftermath has tested European ideals and the credibility of both national 
and European institutions in the eyes of European citizens. The introduction of an EUI 
system could demonstrate European solidarity in a way that is visible and tangible to 
citizens (unlike some of the more abstract European interventions) on a permanent basis. Of 
course, the desirability of such a measure is a political decision. 
Permanent/long-term redistribution across the EU 
The EU already has limited fiscal redistribution mechanisms, albeit small and with 
redistributive roles that are not explicitly geared towards reducing disparities between 
member states. The national balance vis-à-vis the EU budget can be substantial for a small set 
of small and poor countries. The de facto list of net contributors and net beneficiaries also 
appears to be relatively stable. 
Under this rationale, the EUI would be an additional special case of a permanent or long-
term redistribution mechanism between countries of the Union. Consultations during the 
preparation of this paper made it clear that while a degree of persistency in EUI transfers 
might not be always avoidable, permanent or long-term redistribution is not one of the 
rationales for creating such a scheme. Indeed, it could be even seen as a problem to be 
avoided, if possible. 
Figure 4. Net contributors to EU budget 2012, as % of GDP 
 
Source: European Commission 2013 EU, Budget Financial Report 2012. 
Desirability of common standards 
The desirability of common standards in social policy is a contested issue in European affairs 
and is, in the end, a political choice. In the case of the EUI, the issue of common standards 
can cut both ways. One could argue for minimum standards in order to prevent social 
dumping and guarantee equal social rights. By the same token, one could argue for 
‘maximum’ standards to prevent hysteresis and moral hazard.  
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Supporting labour mobility within the EU/euro area 
A relatively uncontested goal of EU policy is to stimulate labour mobility within the Union. 
This could, therefore, be a prima facie rationale for a joint unemployment insurance system. 
However, as explained in this chapter, the current EU regulation for coordinating social 
security systems already ensures that: 
- qualification periods from various countries are cumulated; and 
- the unemployed can move to a different country and still receive unemployment benefits 
(for up to three months, with a possible extension to six months) 
The EU regulation could be beefed up on the second issue and thus stimulate mobility, but 
this could be done through amendment of the existing regulation if needed. So further 
support of labour mobility can be a consequence of the EUI (if it strengthens equality of 
rights/portability), but not an important one.  
Consequently, all of our proposals will address the shock-absorber rationale as the principal 
rationale for an EUI. However, to provide variety on a more contested issue, some proposals 
will address the rationales of demonstrating European solidarity in a visible and tangible 
way for EU citizens and providing common standards. However, the proposals will not seek, 
as overriding rationales, to promote permanent/long-term redistribution across the EU, 
although potential persistent transfers are indeed possible. By the same token, we will 
largely leave the issue of supporting labour mobility within the EU/euro area out of our 
analysis. 
2.6 Summary of existing proposals 
With the establishment of EMU, demands have been voiced for a common European 
unemployment insurance system, in one form or another, to provide a feasible mitigation of 
asymmetric shocks. These proposals have varied from a small fiscal budget freely used in 
domestic spending, to funds based on the output gap, to true mutual unemployment 
schemes. The selection of proposals below provides a broad overview of existing ideas that 
are directly or to some extent related to the EUI proposal.  
 In 1993, Majocchi and Rey delivered a proposal within the MacDougall report advising 
the implementation of a “conjunctural convergence facility” once more mitigating 
asymmetric shocks (Majocchi and Rey, 1993). In contrast to other schemes, this system is not 
triggered automatically; thus is dependent on the evaluation of fellow member states to rule 
out idiosyncratic causes unrelated to external shocks. The fund would provide loans and 
grants to the struggling state, which in turn could pay benefits or invest, for example, in 
additional training, hence bringing down unemployment rates.  
 In the same year Italianer and Vanheukelen (1993) developed the idea of a stabilisation 
mechanism based on the national deviations in the annual change of the unemployment rate 
from the EMU average. Unlike Majocchi and Rey (1993), the stabilisation mechanism has an 
automatic feature, even though the authors propose to cap the receipts to 2% of GDP. They 
also propose a toned-down version in which the transfers are only triggered once a certain 
threshold is passed in order to only activate the mechanism in the event of significant 
asymmetric shocks, i.e. not smoothing small waves but rather ‘tsunamis’.  
 Bajo-Rubio and Diaz-Roldan (2003) developed a European unemployment insurance 
system that functions on a monthly basis as it takes the change over the past 12 months as 
the reference value to trigger the dispersion of benefits. It is a redistribution scheme in which 
each country pays in (1% of tax revenues). Payments are made to those countries which 
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experience a rise in their unemployment rate, however this mechanism is only set in motion 
if at least one country experiences a drop in its unemployment rate, thus testifying to the 
source of the negative changes as an asymmetric shock. Each month, the receiving member 
state uses the transferred funds to support the unemployed. Bajo-Rubio and Diaz-Roldan 
raise another rule that could be applied to reduce the risk of moral hazard: limiting the 
number of consecutive months in which a country is able to receive funds.   
 Enderlein et al. (2013) do not call directly for a European unemployment insurance fund 
but rather a cyclical adjustment insurance fund (CAIF), which is once more based on the 
output gap methodology. They do suggest, however, that the output gap as a main trigger 
could be complemented with indicators such as inflation rates and short-term (cyclical) 
unemployment. They have not included the unemployment indicator in their calculations, 
stating that “short-term unemployment is a problematic indicator as long as labour market 
institutions are in the realm of national legislation”. Of course, the output gap has its 
drawbacks as well and the net effect over the period 1999-2014 would have been very small 
(less than 0.25% of GDP).  
 Sutherland et al. (2012) proposes the creation of a true EU insurance fund that is built at 
the EU level and paid in to by employers or employees, or alternatively an unemployment 
benefit system. The EU benefits would set a minimum standard for the member states, which 
could, in cases of severe crisis, be complemented with supplements and extensions. National 
channels for raising contributions and distributing the benefits should be utilised to 
minimise administrative costs. The paper suggests leaving the decision about the means by 
which to collect the contribution (e.g. tax) up to each individual member state. The authors 
do not provide a simulation of the impact of such a system concerning net benefits or details 
on either coverage or replacement rate.  
 Depla (2012), in his paper for the seminar ‘EU level economic stabilisers’, presents an 
unemployment insurance scheme for the euro area as one part of the toolkit for a wider 
European reform programme. His unemployment benefits scheme differs from the rest since 
it is not a replacement or the basis for national schemes, but rather a supplement. The 
unemployed would only be entitled to the supplement if the European Labour Contract 
were adhered to and if the sum of national and euro area benefits did not exceed the 
maximum threshold, thus preventing a transfer from less generous states to countries with 
highly generous systems. The receipt would be paid from an annual contribution equal to 1% 
of GDP. Depla’s system not only introduces the European component to the unemployment 
insurance scheme, as the others do, but also attaches a social component by limiting the 
transfers.  
 The most comprehensive and in-depth potential architecture for a European 
unemployment insurance system has been proposed by Dullien (2007, 2012, 2013) with the 
ultimate aim of absorbing the negative budgetary effects of short-term unemployment 
caused by the business cycle or asymmetric shocks, though not by structural unemployment. 
The insurance fund would be financed through a payroll tax and the payments and 
contributions would be collected by the national agencies in order to use the existing 
framework and avoid additional bureaucratic costs. A minimal standard of unemployment 
benefits would be covered at the European level, while each member state would be free to 
choose the services/benefits that they provide, nationally, on top of the supranational 
coverage.  He proposes a minimum of 12 weeks with a replacement rate of 50%. In his 
model, Dullien shows the theoretical impact such a system would have had on crisis-ridden 
Spain once the housing bubble has burst. The transfer, according to Dullien, could have 
mitigated almost 25% of the downturn in the immediate aftermath of the collapse. The issue 
of moral hazard is acknowledged and perceivably alleviated in his system, since the EUI 
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only covers a minimum far below the current replacement rate at the national level, thus 
maintaining the incentive structure to implement labour market reforms. The EUI is 
expected to remain balanced in the long run, without clear net receivers and net contributors. 
One element intended to prevent a one-way financial flow is the exclusion of seasonal 
unemployment within his scheme. Dullien’s proposal has frequently been used as a basis for 
political demands by parties and other institutions (Brantner and Giegold, 2012).  
 Pisani-Ferry et al. (2013), pursue a European (EMU) unemployment insurance scheme 
for the same reason as Dullien, i.e. as a fiscal stabiliser. Contrary to Dullien, they propose an 
insurance system levied on a corporate income tax fully covering the expenditures. A euro 
area-wide applied corporate tax rate of 12.6% is estimated to be sufficient to cover the 
average euro area costs for unemployment insurance (1.8% of euro area GDP). 
Unemployment benefits could be covered in full by this budget, with each member state 
transferring revenues from the first 12.6% of tax on corporate income. The distributional 
effect could be significant, since revenues collected from the 12.6% tax may not suffice to 
cover domestic unemployment benefits.  Pisani-Ferry et al. show that this would have been 
the case for Ireland in 2010. In another exercise, the authors calculate the magnitude of 
unemployment benefits in the new common system if receipts are dependent on a set-base 
value (1.5% of GDP) plus a factor of the deviation of the individual unemployment rate from 
the euro area average. Consequently, Portugal (with a less generous national unemployment 
benefits system) would receive more financial resources than needed to cover the benefits, 
thus creating a fiscal stimulus package, whereas Ireland would experience the opposite. The 
common unemployment insurance is not covered directly in the paper, but rather moved to 
the appendix and does not give details of the extent to which benefits are covered at the 
supranational level.  
 Gros et al. (forthcoming) suggest the creation of a European re-insurance scheme for 
major deviations from long-term unemployment rates. The basic idea is to transfer funds 
from the centre to the periphery to finance unemployment benefits when unemployment is 
measurably higher than normal. The system therefore qualifies as reinsurance for national 
unemployment benefits funds.  
3. Outline of main trade-offs and challenges 
In the first chapter of this report, we provided a general overview of existing passive labour 
market policies in Europe and compared them to the United States. We also listed existing 
EU contributions in the field and summarised political and economic arguments behind the 
creation of a European unemployment insurance system. We concluded by summarising 
existing proposals. 
We now focus on two main proposals: the harmonised European unemployment benefit, 
developed by Sebastian Dullien, and the ‘reinsurance’ scheme, a proposal put forward by 
CEPS (Gros et al., forthcoming). The harmonised scheme consists of an insurance fund 
financed through a payroll tax (collected by national agencies) and spent on a minimum 
standard of unemployment benefits that applies in the same fashion to all eligible European 
workers. Reinsurance is a radically different system based on a re-insurance fund which will 
be used only in the event of severe recessions, in light of the fact that ‘business as usual’ 
downturns are already well covered by existing policies. 
The two proposals are conceptually extremely different. The first is meant to cover ‘business 
as usual’ shocks; it creates a fund for rainy days. The second covers ‘tail risks’, or in other 
words creates a shelter for very stormy days and tornados.  
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Figure 5. Out-of-work income maintenance and support, % of GDP (average 2005-2011) 
 
Source: Eurostat.  
In this chapter we delve into the economic, political and practical challenges related to the 
creation of a supranational automatic stabiliser. The chapter is divided into two main parts. 
In the first, we look at three key policy dimensions: 
- The threshold and a ceiling for its activation. Any system of unemployment insurance 
needs to define under what conditions it is triggered. This also means that an indicator 
needs to be chosen for this purpose.  
- Common standards for the EU. Should they be enforced? If so, what would they be? 
- Fiscal rule. Should the EUI have a balanced budget on an annual basis, cyclically, or not 
necessarily balanced at all? 
In the second part of this chapter, we discuss three additional technical issues: 
- Participation. Should the scheme involve all EU or euro area countries in a mandatory or 
voluntary fashion? 
- Funding. How should it be organised? What is the source?  
- Implications for other labour and EU policies. Should the EUI also be concerned with 
active labour market policies? Is there any overlap with, for instance, the European Social 
and Globalisation Adjustment Fund?  
3.1 What situations should it cover? What should be the trigger? 
Deciding under what circumstances the EUI should be activated represents an important 
step in designing the European unemployment insurance scheme. The EUI could either be 
applied with a business as usual approach or be activated only in exceptional circumstances. 
If the ‘harmonised option’ is put in place, it would be activated whenever a worker becomes 
unemployed for a given number of weeks. Conversely, the reinsurance proposal would kick 
in only under exceptional economic shocks, such as severe recession, where public finances 
are put under stress by a greater demand for unemployment benefits. 
During the last crisis, expenditure on passive labour market policies climbed to 
approximately 3% of GDP in Spain and Ireland, from 1.5% and 0.9% in 2007, respectively.  
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The setting-up of the reinsurance option would imply the adoption of a set of reference 
indicators. We analyse the possible options among the following list of indicators: the output 
gap, the unemployment rate, the unemployment gap and the unemployment ratio.  
3.1.1 Unemployment rate and short-term unemployment (rate) 
The unemployment rate is prima facie the most natural choice of indicator, because it is 
indeed meant for the assessment of employment policies. In addition, it is a solid indicator, 
given that it is based on a head-count.11 However, it raises some issues. 
First, there is a long-standing debate among labour economists about the solidity of this 
indicator, which is considered by many experts inappropriate for measuring the temperature 
of the labour market. The reason is that the unemployment rate does not measure the share 
of people that do not have work in the population, but the share of those in the labour force 
who do not have a job and are also actively looking for one. Therefore, all those who are 
available to work but are not actively job-seeking are not recorded in the statistics.  
Second, it is important to note that a significant part of the unemployment rate is unrelated 
to short-term shocks but is of a structural nature. The group of unemployed it measures is 
made up of two main subgroups: those whose unemployment duration is a small natural 
transition from one job to another, and those with a longer unemployment duration is 
because their skills do not match existing vacancies. The former has a short-term nature, 
whereas the latter is much more persistent and requires enormous effort to curb. A policy 
that does not take structural differences into account would, as a consequence, give rise to a 
rather unbalanced flow of funds over time. This is a problem if one focuses on the 
redistribution rationale rather than the cushioning of shocks rationale. However, since the 
cushioning argument appears to be among the key arguments for the creation of an EUI, we 
do not recommend using a headline unemployment rate. 
For this reason we propose to consider the short-term rate, not the overall unemployment 
rate, but. This would be consistent with the fact that unemployment benefits generally do not 
cover the entire unemployment spell, but instead have a maximum length of eligibility.12 An 
unlimited duration constitutes a disincentive to look for a job, especially if the income 
subsidy is generous.  
The EU short-term unemployment rate, defined as up to 12 months of unemployment, was 
on average 4% during the period 2003-2012. In the following cases, it exceeded 6%:   
- Greece in 2011-2012 
- Spain before 2004 and since 2008 
- Estonia in 2009-2010 
- Latvia between 2009 and 2012 
- Lithuania between 2009 and 2011 
- Poland up to 2004 
- Cyprus and Portugal since 2012  
Interestingly enough, the list does not include the Irish Great Recession.  
                                                     
11 The head-count is not based on the entire working population; only a small share of the population 
is interviewed for the Labour Force Survey. However, the methodology is solid and agreed at the EU 
level via Eurostat.  
12 Belgium, where unemployment benefits are provided until the worker finds a new job, is an 
exception. In all countries, systems have become less and less generous over the past 20 years in order 
to create the incentive to reduce the length of the work-to-work transition.  
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Figure 6. Short-term unemployment in Europe 
 
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey.  
In the case of the harmonised unemployment benefit system, we use short-term 
unemployment (not the rate, but the headcount) for the simulation, i.e. the number of people 
without a job and actively looking for one, and in their first 12 months of the unemployment 
spell.  
3.1.2 Unemployment gap 
Another option is to use distance from the national ‘norm’. In other words, the EUI would be 
activated if the difference between actual unemployment and the norm exceeds a certain 
value.  
The reference value could be either a long-term historical average or some measure of 
structural unemployment, such as the NAWRU. While these two options might appear 
similar, they are conceptually distinct. Moreover, each has obvious advantages and 
disadvantages.  
Using an historical average minimises uncertainty or interpretation issues, but it brings a 
difficult trade-off. If the reference period is fairly short (say, 5-10 years), then the ‘norm’ can 
be influenced upwards by a prolonged economic slump and thus limit the impact and 
rationale of the EUI. If the reference period is longer than this, then it penalises successful 
labour market reform during the crisis.  
These issues could be resolved by using a measure of structural unemployment, like the 
NAWRU, that would correct/augment the long-term average with a more nuanced 
assessment.  
This option also comes with a downside. On the one hand, it introduces a degree of 
contestability and discretion because the NAWRU is more difficult to estimate than the 
simple unemployment rate and as such, it is subject to ex post revisions.13 On the other hand, 
                                                     
13 A similar problem has been documented for the estimation and subsequent series of revisions for 
the output gap. 
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discretion is created with regard to the choice of the reference value. Should it be NAWRU 
plus 1%, 2% or something else? 
3.1.3 What trigger for the EUI? Pros and cons of the different options  
We summarise the pros and cons linked to the selection of one indicator or the other in Table 
5. Our preference is for the unemployment gap in our simulation. The reason is that it 
captures well the impact of the shock by focusing on the distance from a certain level (we 
choose a measure of the structural unemployment rate). The downside of this choice is the 
difficulty of setting a benchmark which is, to a certain extent, discretionary. What is an 
‘emergency level’ of unemployment? The structural unemployment rate plus 2%? Plus 3%? 
Nonetheless, we consider this option preferable and therefore when we model the 
‘reinsurance’, we use NAWRU + 2% as a trigger for the policy.  
In the model for the harmonised system, however, we use the short-term unemployment 
rate, i.e. the percentage of people without a job and actively looking for one, in their first 12 
months of the unemployment spell. These are the unemployed workers entitled to receive an 
income-support benefit.   
Table 5. Indicator to trigger EUI, pros and cons compared 
Indicator to trigger EUI14 Pros Cons 
Short-term unemployment 
rate  
Clear and unambiguous, fast 
response to shock 
Higher variability across 
European countries 
Unemployment gap 
Better captures longer-term 
impact of the shock 
Ex post revisions, difficulty in 
setting up benchmark 
Conclusions: The simulation uses the unemployment gap for reinsurance’ and short-term 
unemployment for the ‘harmonised system’. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
3.2 What should be the fiscal rule for the EUI and the country 
contributions? 
In the previous sections of this chapter we analysed two key technical aspects that 
accompany the conception of a cross-national system of unemployment insurance: the 
trigger and the reference indicator. The next important step deals with the fiscal side of the 
system. First of all, should a rule exist at all? Or should expenditure be balanced at an annual 
level? Is an intermediate option possible? Additionally, how should the system treat a 
country that is in persistent deficit vis-à-vis the system? 
3.2.1 A system balanced annually 
We start by analysing one extreme option: a system that is balanced every year. In other 
words, whatever is collected during the year is redistributed across countries during the 
same year. As a consequence, the system would not run any deficit and neither any surplus.  
This option has one main attraction: it would avoid problems related to the capacity of the 
EUI to borrow in case of deficit. 
                                                     
14 Relevant only for option 2 – reinsurance. Option 1, harmonised European unemployment benefit, 
does not require a trigger. 
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But apart from this, the case for an annually balanced fund is weak, especially given the 
technical complications. An annual distribution would in principle be possible, but highly 
problematic in practice. Such an approach, in fact, would require permanent calibration of 
the system on an annual basis, leading to unpredictability and uncertainty at the national 
level, thus eliminating to some extent the very rationale for an EUI.  
A further argument against this option is the risk of symmetric shocks (e.g. the Great 
Recession). Without the possibility to borrow or use reserves, the system would end up 
transferring resources between countries undergoing difficulties. 
3.2.2 A flexible system: No fiscal rule 
The second extreme option is the rule of not imposing a rule. The EUI would not be subject 
to an ex ante decision on its fiscal rule. Deficits and/or the possibility to resort to extra 
funding, beside the national annual contributions, are therefore not ruled out. The main 
advantage is the possibility of ensuring the greatest flexibility to deal with a variety and 
different combinations of (symmetric and asymmetric) shocks.  
Yet, an open-ended commitment remains difficult to impose. It would hardly be considered 
politically acceptable, and it would impose technical challenges in terms of consistency with 
the existing EU seven-year budgetary framework.   
3.2.3 Fiscal balance over the economic cycle 
We consider a third intermediate option in which the system would be balanced, but only 
over the economic cycle. In other words, the fund would be able to run surpluses annually, 
but would need a fiscal balance over the medium term.  
Such an approach could be materialised in two ways:  
- An account in the fund, which has to be balanced over the medium term, corresponds to 
each country. In case of necessity the fund would intervene to contribute to the 
expenditure on unemployment benefits, but on condition that the loan is paid back based 
on an agreement with the central authority that manages the system.  
- Alternatively, countries would be allowed to run deficits/surpluses vis-à-vis the EUI, 
even over the medium term, as long as the fund as a whole is in balance over the cycle. 
We recommend the first approach; the reason being that it strikes a fair compromise between 
two needs: being strongly anti-cyclical, and limiting the scope for permanent transfers across 
countries.  
How could the balance be achieved? This could be done on the revenue as well on the 
expenditure side. In the first case, rebalancing would occur via an automatic increase in each 
country’s contribution after a certain number of years of deficit. Alternatively, it could be 
achieved on the expenditure side by automatically limiting EUI transfers, again, after a 
certain time. The US experience strongly pushes in favour of the former: a balancing path 
based on an automatic increase of the national contribution. In the US, as explained in 
chapter 2, states can borrow from the federal account if needed, meaning that they do not 
receive permanent transfers from the central account. Moreover, if they fail to repay the loan, 
the federal system is authorised to increase the employers’ contribution for that state in order 
to accelerate the speed of the rebalancing path.   
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3.2.4 What fiscal rule for the EUI? Pros and cons of the different options 
We summarise in Table 6 the pros and cons outlined in the previous sections of the three 
options: an unemployment benefit scheme that is either balanced annually, or is fully 
flexible, or is balanced but only over the cycle.  
Our preference, for both the ‘harmonised scheme’ and ‘reinsurance’, is for the latter: each 
country can borrow in stormy years, but needs to compensate with a surplus in sunny ones. 
Even though more complex, this option strikes a good balance between the need for a system 
that is counter-cyclical and the risk of redistributing towards countries with structurally 
higher levels and rates of unemployment.  
For the sake of comparison, however, we also model a fully flexible system with no fiscal 
rule.  
Table 6. A fiscal framework for the EUI 
Fiscal framework Pros Cons 
Annual balance Simplicity, no need to deal 
with borrowing capacity 
Unable to respond to the frequent 
combination of symmetric and asymmetric 
shocks, consequently likely to provide least 
support when most needed 
No fiscal rule Simplicity 
Strongly anticyclical, 
especially in sustained 
downturns 
Open-ended commitment for member 
states – difficult both politically and 
technically 
Balanced over the 
economic cycle 
A combination of 
countercyclical policy with 
constraints on the overall 
cost and contribution 
Technically more complex than the other 
two options 
Conclusions: The simulation will work with two options – no fiscal rule and balanced over the 
economic cycle 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
3.3 Should there be common EU standards for unemployment benefits? 
As explained in chapter 1, automatic stabilisers exist in all EU countries. Europeans can 
actually claim to have invented them; the first law to set up a public compulsory 
unemployment insurance system was passed in Germany under Bismarck’s government in 
the 1880s. Differences exist in terms of generosity and coverage ratios, for example, but what 
is certain in Europe is that a form of income protection is granted to a majority of workers if 
they become unemployed for reasons independent of their own will.  
There is more than one argument in favour of harmonisation. Aside from simplicity, 
harmonisation would substantially increase Europe’s visibility and support thanks to the 
creation of a strong and perceptible social standard. Harmonisation could happen de jure, for 
example via a regulation on minimum standards for unemployment benefits, or de facto by 
setting up a unified European benefit system, partially or completely replacing national 
systems. Either way, common standards would need to be agreed upon for the key 
dimensions of unemployment insurance: coverage rates, replacement ratios, duration and 
eligibility.  
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Harmonisation also presents significant challenges. Just in terms of duration, the provision of 
such a benefit for one year would impose a change in the systems of eight countries where 
the duration is currently between 6 and 11 months.15 Moreover, harmonisation under the 
Council of Europe instruments was possible only because of the lowest common 
denominator (21 weeks).  
A potential compromise would be to set a framework that would provide some flexibility to 
member states. For example, similar to what was suggested by the European Commission 
(EC 2013), a possible standard could be: 75% of short-term unemployed workers covered, 
with a replacement rate of at least 50% of gross wage for one year.  
A related issue to be considered on this front is whether conditionality should be applied in 
the use of funds. Should the supranational authority link the supply of EUI funds to, for 
example, the implementation of labour market and welfare reforms? The possibility for the 
supranational authority to have a say on how common funds are used would help more 
reluctant countries to accept the creation of a common system, especially in a situation where 
there is high cross-country heterogeneity in the provision of income support in the case of 
unemployment. A distinction needs to be made based on the type of system. Under the 
harmonised European unemployment benefit proposal, there would be no need to apply 
conditionality because the creation of an EUI would go hand-in-hand with a form of 
harmonisation of national systems via the creation of a common minimum standard. Under 
reinsurance, conditionality could be applied. We do not recommend its application, 
however, because it would not alter calculations on the volume of fiscal transfers anyway, 
but would only influence how these are used. We leave the discussion open. 
The pros and cons of the pan-European harmonisation of benefit schemes on the issue of 
conditionality are summarised in Table 7.  
Table 7. Standards and conditionality applicable to the EUI 
Unification of 
national UB 
Pros Cons 
Common UB 
standards 
Clarity 
Strong signal of Social 
Europe for citizens 
Requires politically challenging unification 
Provides less scope for incorporating national 
preferences 
Conditionality Strong anticyclical 
impact guaranteed, 
Higher political/social 
support 
Alternative uses by national government might be 
more efficient 
Can create imbalances in generosity/coverage 
between the European system and other national 
parts of a benefit system  
Lack of democratic accountability of the authority 
imposing reforms 
Conclusions: The simulation will provide two alternative approaches consistent with the logic 
of the two basic options. The harmonised unemployment benefit option will rely on common 
standards and conditionality. The reinsurance option will provide leeway for national 
governments on both fronts. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
                                                     
15 Slovakia and Malta (6 months), Austria and Cyprus (7), Italy (8), Ireland and Greece (10), Portugal 
(11). 
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3.4 Additional technical issues 
Three cornerstones of the EUI system have been analysed in depth in the previous two 
sections: the trigger and the indicator, common standards, and the fiscal rule. In this last 
section we discuss three additional points. The first is participation: is the EUI meant for all 
EU countries, or just the euro area? Is participation compulsory or voluntary? The second is 
funding: should it be pay-as-you-go or have a funded element? The third is the interaction 
between the unemployment insurance and other related labour market policies, as well as 
other existing EU programmes related to the social domain.  
3.4.1 Participation: EU28 versus the euro area 
An issue to be discussed in the conceptualisation of a supranational unemployment 
insurance mechanism is its membership. Which EU countries are entitled to participate? And 
should membership to the system be considered compulsory or voluntary? An answer to this 
question is possible but, again, not simple.  
Statistically speaking, the larger the group the better; a bigger group of 
contributors/potential users would make the fund more solid by the simple law of large 
numbers. A large group of contributors would imply that over a long period of time, if 
shocks occur randomly, everyone will benefit from participation and therefore have an 
interest in joining. An EU-wide scheme would also be logical from a legislative point of 
view, as the same rule would apply to all countries.16  
Nonetheless, we are aware that enhanced cooperation is possible and if there is no 
agreement among 28 countries, it remains a valid option. In such a case, the second-best 
outcome would be an agreement between countries that are part of the monetary union. 
Such a group needs to include member states that, as part of their accession agreement, are 
deemed to join the EMU (Sweden, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and 
Croatia) plus Denmark and Lithuania, given that they have a fixed peg with the euro.  
On the issue of voluntary versus mandatory participation, economic theory would strongly 
recommend putting in place a mandatory system. Such a system, independently of how it is 
organised technically, would work as a supranational insurance between existing national 
insurances. In the event of voluntary participation, a problem of adverse selection would 
arise as only those with a higher probability of requiring it would participate. To avoid this 
basic microeconomic trap, we therefore recommend a mandatory EU- or euro area-wide of 
system.  
One exception could be made, again borrowed from the US experience. In the 1930s when 
the US system was put in place, no country was obliged to set up a national unemployment 
insurance policy. Yet all states did so over time because where no system was in place, a 
payroll tax was imposed on employers in any case. This created a strong incentive for all 
states to set up their own system and collect that tax to finance a policy they could design.  
3.4.2 Revenues 
For the sake of the design of sound public policies, the discussion on the revenue of the 
system deserves as much attention as spending. We divide this into two sub-questions: the 
first concerns the type of taxation that should finance it; the second is whether the fund 
should be ‘pay-as-you-go’ (PAYG) or funded.  
                                                     
16 For this reason, we base our simulation on the assumption that all EU countries join the system. 
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The necessary revenue to finance the EUI can be generated via three forms of taxation. One 
option is a dedicated tax on consumption or on labour. The second alternative is a 
contribution from national governments not directly linked to a specific tax. Given the heavy 
labour taxation in some member states, it is questionable whether additional labour taxation 
is advisable. Figure 6 shows that the tax wedge is particularly high in euro area countries 
with high unemployment. Of course, one could argue that EUI labour taxation will only 
replace a national one. However, an EUI funded through labour taxation would tend to 
increase labour taxation, at least in countries with high unemployment, because the higher 
generosity of the common system as well as their higher unemployment would tend to lead 
to higher rates of taxation. 
Figure 7. Tax wedge by family type, 2012  
 
Source: OECD (2012).  
On the other hand, this option creates intuitive and robust proportion between benefits and 
contributions. For this reason, we will base the simulation of Dullien’s (2012) model on this 
type of financing.  
A dedicated recurrent tax does not make sense for the reinsurance model, where the benefits 
are highly irregular and a fiscal relationship exists solely between the EUI and national 
governments, so in that proposal we propose to fund the EUI through contributions by 
national governments not specifically linked to a certain tax. 
In terms of a pay-as-you-go versus a funded system, the PAYG system would be based on 
the following: 
- A contribution equivalent to average long-term expected annual expenditure of the 
system; 
- The system would need to make two decisions: what to do with surpluses and deficits; 
- In our model, we will assume that surpluses will be retained to cover future deficits and 
that deficits will be covered by a bridging loan. 
In other words, even a PAYG system can deliver surpluses and deficits that lead to an 
accumulated fund or liability, but they are incidental and temporary. 
On the other hand, a funded system would be based on the following: 
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- An annual contribution that would be paid until a predetermined amount is 
accumulated; 
- Contributions would be restarted only if contributions fell below the threshold again. 
The accumulation of funding would thus be by design. 
PAYG is less costly than a funded system during the initial period, as it does not seek to first 
accumulate a pile of cash. However, a funded system can be more easily anti-cyclical, both 
for individual countries and the system as a whole. 
3.4.3 Implications for other programmes  
Unemployment insurance at the national level funds not only passive labour market policy 
measures (i.e. unemployment benefits), but also active labour market policy measures. 
Therefore, a logical question is whether and how the European system should incorporate 
this. 
For a variety of reasons, we do not recommend that the EUI incorporate active labour market 
policy financing. Given the role of other European financial instruments and of other 
European policy instruments, this would only add to complications. Therefore, our 
proposals are based on expectations that other programmes would continue. 
Nevertheless, the creation of an EUI raises the opportunity to revisit existing instruments at 
the European level in the social domain and offers the possibility to discuss them again in 
order to create a coherent system of European social policies. It was argued in chapter 1, 
neither the European Social Fund nor the Globalisation Adjustment Fund can overlap with 
the EUI. If combined, however, they could from the backbone of European labour market 
policies in a way that is consistent with flexicurity principles. The EUI would ensure income 
protection, whereas the ESF would focus on protecting employment (or re-employment) by 
contributing to the funding of active labour market policies. The GAF would then continue 
to be used to facilitate structural adjustments that hit special categories of workers more 
harshly, such as blue-collar workers and the low skilled.  
3.4.4 Pros and cons of participation and funding 
In Table 8 we summarise the pros and cons of smaller/larger participation in the fund and 
how countries/workers should contribute to it.  
Starting with participation, we believe that greater participation, ideally the EU28, would 
make the fund more stable in economic terms. We therefore model this case in our 
simulation. Yet we remain fully aware of the political challenges associated with this option 
and for this reason we consider a smaller set of countries as a second-best option. The natural 
choice falls on euro area members, which have a stronger economic case for the creation of 
automatic stabilisers.   
What needs to be clear is that, whichever group is preferred, participation in the fund needs 
to be compulsory for its members in order to avoid an adverse selection trap.  
As far as funding is concerned, we consider two options: a payroll tax for the ‘harmonised 
scheme’, and funding from governments not linked to a specific tax for ‘reinsurance’. We do 
not consider one to be better than the other. The payroll tax clearly links the costs and 
benefits of the system, at the individual and the national level. The downside is that it risks 
increasing the tax wedge on labour costs; already very high in most European countries.  
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For ‘reinsurance’ we consider national funding without specifying its source, which would 
not increase the tax wedge but at the same time would create a disconnection between costs 
and benefits, contributors and beneficiaries.   
Table 8. Participation and funding, a comparison of different options 
Additional issues Pros Cons 
EU28 participation Higher stabilisation capacity Politically more challenging 
to approve 
Eurozone participation Easier political link to 
monetary union 
Less stabilisation capacity 
Funding by labour taxation  Direct link between revenue 
and benefits both 
individually and nationally 
Can increase labour tax 
wedge in countries with 
already high labour taxation 
Funding by national fiscal 
contribution 
Does not contribute to 
increasing labour tax wedge 
Does not provide the direct 
link between revenue and 
benefits  
Conclusions: The simulation will be based on the EU28 to demonstrate stabilisation effects for 
all EU economies, particularly given the ever-expanding euro area membership. 
The simulation will also provide two alternative approaches consistent with the logic of the 
two basic options. The harmonised unemployment benefit option will rely on direct labour 
taxation. The reinsurance option will be based on general subsidy to and from national 
governments. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration.   
4. European unemployment insurance: Simulation results 
In this chapter, we analyse in detail the two main existing proposals for the set-up of a 
European system of unemployment benefits. We will show the scale of expenditure and the 
necessary revenues these two options would entail. Before moving to this and independently 
of the exact design, it is worth summarising the ideal characteristics of such a system. There 
are obviously many trade-offs, but given that insurance schemes have been in place in 
Europe for more than a century, enough has been learned from experience to design an 
appropriate mechanism. In our opinion, the EUI should ideally: 
- be organised in such a way that each country has its funds balanced over the cycle; 
- involve all EU member states; and 
- be based on mandatory participation.  
We present the results of our Excel-based simulations of how the European unemployment 
insurance system would work. We quantify four scenarios, as shown in the following table. 
These scenarios present two radically different versions of the EUI and then we tweak them. 
Option 1 is the harmonised European unemployment benefit, which would cover all eligible 
EU citizens and at least partially replace the current national unemployment insurance. 
Option 2 is the unemployment reinsurance for states where national unemployment 
insurance systems would remain intact and member states would get financial assistance 
from the EU system only if they experience a large negative unemployment shock. For both 
options, we quantify a simple ‘a’ version and a ‘b’ version with long-term country-level 
budgetary neutrality. The second option was added to allow the avoidance of a transfer 
union if that is an important policy objective in setting up the system.  
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Table 9. Matrix of scenarios explored in the chapter 
 
No long-term country-level 
budgetary neutrality 
Long-term country-level 
budgetary neutrality 
Harmonised European 
unemployment benefit 
Option 1a Option 1b 
Unemployment reinsurance  Option 2a Option 2b 
Source: Authors’ elaboration.   
We focused on two principles in setting up the options: simplicity and comparability. We 
tried to keep the option design as simple as possible to allow readers to understand how the 
simulation works. We also set up both options and both approaches to country-level 
budgetary neutrality in a similar way, calibrating them similarly. This enables us to compare 
them easily and to see similarities as well as differences. 
The simulation is based on historical data from 1999 to 2012, which gives us 14 years of the 
simulation. For some countries, there are some missing values, but this does not materially 
influence results. Thus, the simulation shows how the EUI would have worked if these 
mechanisms had existed at the time. Since it is an intellectual exercise, it includes countries 
that joined in the 2004 and 2007 waves (and Croatia in 2013) as if they had been EU members 
at the time. The point is to show potential effects of the EUI based on historical data as a 
counterfactual, not to simulate history. The decision to start in 1999 was based on a 
combination of data availability (particularly for the new member states) and the symbolism 
of the euro area establishment in 1999. 
Calibration of the EUI expenditure (generosity) was based on findings in chapters 2 and 3. 
Calibration of the EUI revenue was set up to achieve rough financial balance over the long 
run. 
For each option, we show:  
- the size of the contribution to the system; 
- the size of the contribution paid by the system to the country; 
- the annual balance at country level, i.e. the net stimulus provided by the EUI; and 
- the cumulative balance, i.e. long-term balance of each country vis-a-vis the EUI. 
In addition, we also illustrate revenues, expenditures, annual and cumulative balance for the 
system as a whole.  
From a methodological point of view, it should be emphasised that Excel-based simulation 
has advantages and limits. The key advantage is that we can simulate a variety of options at 
both the EU and country level quickly and with limited resources. It is suitable for the 
calculation of revenues and expenditures and gives a flavour of how important the system 
would be compared to the existing national stabilisers. 
On the other hand, it is not a general or partial equilibrium model that would show dynamic 
effects of such a system on the member states, or for the EU economy as a whole. 
Nonetheless, what emerges from the simulation is that the size of the stimulus would in any 
case be not large enough to have material substantial second-order effects. 
As a source of data, we used AMECO, the annual macro-economic database of the European 
Commission’s Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs.  
For some countries, we had to simulate short-term unemployment data for some years. This 
was done by calculating the share of short-term unemployment in overall unemployment for 
the available years and then extrapolating for the missing years from overall unemployment. 
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Before presenting the fiscal effects of the simulation, let us now present a comparison of the 
generosity of the simulated European unemployment insurance system with current national 
systems. We present this here because we use the same level of generosity for both options, 
but under Option 2 the national governments would not be required to spend the money in 
this way. 
Table 10. Comparison of proposed EUI with actual national unemployment insurance systems, 
as of 2010 
 Gross 
replacement rate* 
Gross 
replacement rate** 
Coverage  
(% of Labour Force) 
Duration  
(in weeks) 
Austria 0.40 0.32 0.68 30 
Belgium 0.50 0.37 0.66 unlimited 
Bulgaria 0.60 0.52 0.66 40 
Cyprus 0.63 0.55 0.79 26 
Czech Republic 0.56 0.43 0.91 26 
Denmark 0.52 0.47 0.72 105 
Estonia 0.50 0.37 0.74 50 
Finland 0.54 0.44 1.00 100 
France 0.57 0.42 0.61 104 
Germany 0.42 0.34 0.67 50 
Greece 0.58 0.45 1.00 50 
Hungary 0.34 0.27 0.87 40 
Ireland 0.47 0.44 1.00 50 
Italy 0.50 0.37 0.53 34 
Latvia 0.55 0.46 0.75 40 
Lithuania 0.34 0.26 0.67 21 
Luxembourg 0.83 0.71 0.95 50 
Malta 0.20 0.18 0.88 26 
Netherlands 0.75 0.59 0.83 44 
Poland 0.24 0.20 0.54 26 
Portugal 0.65 0.50 0.76 78 
Romania 0.27 0.22 0.43 26 
Slovakia 0.46 0.35 0.57 26 
Slovenia 0.70 0.60 0.80 26 
Spain 0.63 0.49 0.58 102 
Sweden 0.57 0.43 0.96 62 
United Kingdom 0.13 0.11 0.86 26 
EUI NA 0.40 0.75 52 
*Ratio with denominator gross wages (Source: SPIN). 
** converted to ratio with total compensation as denominator (Source: AMECO). 
Sources: European Commission and SPIN database.  
The table shows that the proposed coverage ratio in the EUI system is above that of most 
non-euro area member states, with the exception of Sweden, the Czech Republic, Hungary 
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and the UK (and is equal to the Latvian ratio). Within the euro area, the group is split evenly 
with eight below and nine above the EUI’s 75% coverage ratio.  
The maximum duration of entitlements has been chosen to be rather high. It is based on the 
logic that if the EUI is supposed to cover unemployment benefits for the cyclically 
unemployed, then the benefit should cover all short-term unemployed. 
 The most controversial item, the replacement ratio, is set at 40% relative to total 
compensation. This is closer to the higher end than the lower end of the distribution, which 
within the EU is very heterogeneous.   
4.1 Option 1: Harmonised European unemployment benefit 
Option 1 in the simulation is the harmonised European unemployment benefit (see chapter 1 
for a summary of existing proposals). The harmonised system applies automatically to every 
eligible unemployed person.  
We quantify the following scenario for the joint European benefits system: 
- It would apply to short-term unemployed workers. Our reference unemployed 
population does not therefore include all unemployed workers, but only those who have 
been unemployed for less than one year. We set the maximum duration of benefit to 12 
months. However, our calculation is based on an average recipient duration of 6 months, 
so we expect a symmetric pattern of people leaving the register. In the absence of data on 
the duration profiles of the unemployed across European countries, this appeared to be 
the best option. 
- The coverage ratio is set at 75%, meaning that among those unemployed for less than a 
year, three-quarters are eligible to receive benefits.  
- The benefit is equivalent to 40% of the average monthly national nominal compensation. 
It should be noted that 40% of nominal compensation is not as low as it sounds, since it is 
calculated not from a gross wage but from nominal compensation, which also includes 
employer social security contributions. 
The member states would be free to set eligibility rules and replacement rates. If the cost 
were to be less than the formula below, the member state would receive the actual amount. If 
the cost were to be higher than the formula, the member state would receive an amount 
equivalent to the 75%*40% formula. This would avoid difficult-to-achieve formal 
harmonisation, while ensuring that there would be de facto harmonisation since member 
states would be incentivised to set up the system in such a way as to be close to the 75%*40% 
formula. In other words, more generous systems would be allowed, but on top of the 
harmonised one.  
                                                        
where U stands for unemployment and MNCE indicates the monthly nominal compensation 
per employee.  
How would the system be financed? We choose as the source of funding a dedicated labour 
taxation equivalent to 0.5% of nominal compensation. The rate was set up to roughly balance 
the system as shown in this chapter. 
                                           
As previously anticipated, we present two versions of the system. In Option 1a, the system 
does not require a country-level neutral budgetary position. In other words, countries can be 
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permanently in deficit or in surplus vis-à-vis the system, without any corrective mechanisms. 
This represents a truly European system, which essentially ignores boundaries in the fiscal 
sense and is able to redistribute resources in the case of shocks.  
We modify the system in the simulation 1b, where each country needs to restore a neutral 
budgetary position. How? Fiscal neutrality would be achieved by doubling the contribution 
rate from 0.5% to 1% of the base for countries that have a cumulative deficit with the system 
of at least 1% of GDP. The double contribution rate would stop once the cumulative deficit 
falls below 1% of GDP.17 
The choice of the medium-to-long run is because a quicker adjustment would hinder the 
stabilisation capacity by imposing a fiscal effort on countries that are already facing 
difficulties due to high unemployment rates. 
4.1.1 The harmonised unemployment system with no fiscal rule (Option 1a)  
As previously anticipated, for each of the four scenarios we show: 
- system revenues by country (who pays how much in); 
- system expenditure by country (who gets how much out); 
- annual balance at the country-level, i.e. the net stimulus provided by the EUI; 
- cumulative balance, i.e. the long-term balance of each country with the EUI; and 
- revenues, expenditures, and annual and cumulative balance for the system as a whole. 
We start with revenues by country as a percentage of GDP for the period 1999-2012 that 
result from a contribution of 0.5% of nominal compensation of employees for each worker. 
Given that they tend to be stable over time, we do not show the annual values, only the 
minimum value achieved over the entire period, the maximum value and the mean.  
The mean value oscillates between 0.24 and 0.36, with Luxembourg being the only exception. 
The total range for all countries and all years oscillates between 0.22% and 0.39% of GDP, 
again with Luxembourg as the only exception.  
Given that the contribution mechanism is set up as the same percentage of nominal 
compensation, differences primarily reflect different shares of labour compensation in GDP. 
In that sense, it is mildly cyclical as it tends to decline in periods of high unemployment, but 
only to a limited extent.  
The countries with the highest contribution over the whole period are the Netherlands 
(0.36%), Austria (0.33%), Belgium, France Romania, Slovenia and the UK (all 0.31%). At the 
other extreme are Luxembourg (0.16%), Hungary and Lithuania (0.24%), and Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, Ireland, Latvia and Poland (all 0.25%). Figures are presented in Table 11.  
Table 11. EUI annual revenues by country as % of GDP (minimum, maximum and mean values) 
 Min Max Mean (1999-2012) 
Belgium 0.3 0.32 0.31 
Bulgaria 0.23 0.27 0.25 
Czech Republic 0.23 0.26 0.25 
Denmark 0.28 0.31 0.29 
Germany  0.28 0.3 0.29 
Estonia 0.24 0.29 0.26 
                                                     
17 Alternatively, the stop could be set to balance – 0% of GDP. This would not have much of an effect 
on the current simulation. 
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Ireland 0.23 0.28 0.25 
Greece 0.25 0.29 0.27 
Spain 0.29 0.31 0.3 
France 0.31 0.32 0.31 
Croatia 0.28 0.31 0.29 
Italy 0.27 0.31 0.29 
Cyprus 0.27 0.3 0.28 
Latvia 0.23 0.28 0.25 
Lithuania 0.22 0.27 0.24 
Luxembourg 0.14 0.18 0.16 
Hungary 0.23 0.25 0.24 
Malta 0.25 0.26 0.26 
Netherlands 0.35 0.38 0.36 
Austria 0.32 0.34 0.33 
Poland 0.23 0.29 0.25 
Portugal 0.28 0.3 0.29 
Romania 0.27 0.39 0.31 
Slovenia 0.3 0.33 0.31 
Slovakia 0.22 0.25 0.23 
Finland 0.27 0.3 0.28 
Sweden 0.28 0.3 0.29 
United Kingdom 0.3 0.32 0.31 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on AMECO data.  
Expenditure figures, as a percentage of GDP, are presented in Table 12. A quick glance at the 
data shows that expenditure oscillates much more than revenue and thus provides the main 
anti-cyclical element. It exceeds 0.5% of GDP in the worst year for Estonia (0.76%), Ireland 
(0.57%), Greece (0.73%), Spain (1.3%), Cyprus (0.58%), Latvia (0.89%), Lithuania (0.72%), 
Poland (0.66%) and Portugal (0.59%). However, only for Spain does this translate into a 
mean expenditure over the period that is greater than 0.5% of GDP (0.71%). For the rest, 
increased expenditure is a temporary phenomenon, reflecting primarily, though not 
exclusively, the period of the Great Recession.  
Table 12. EUI annual expenditure by country as % of GDP (minimum, maximum and mean values) 
 Min Max Mean 
Belgium 0.18 0.3 0.25 
Bulgaria 0.13 0.43 0.28 
Czech Republic 0.13 0.28 0.21 
Denmark 0.15 0.36 0.25 
Germany 0.2 0.36 0.29 
Estonia 0.13 0.76 0.36 
Ireland 0.13 0.57 0.25 
Greece 0.24 0.73 0.35 
Spain 0.43 1.3 0.71 
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France 0.3 0.42 0.36 
Croatia 0.16 0.44 0.33 
Italy 0.18 0.35 0.24 
Cyprus 0.16 0.58 0.27 
Latvia 0.25 0.89 0.42 
Lithuania 0.18 0.72 0.42 
Luxembourg 0.07 0.15 0.11 
Hungary 0.18 0.37 0.25 
Malta 0.14 0.19 0.16 
Netherlands 0.11 0.25 0.17 
Austria 0.2 0.29 0.24 
Poland 0.25 0.66 0.45 
Portugal 0.16 0.59 0.29 
Romania 0.14 0.3 0.22 
Slovenia 0.16 0.38 0.26 
Slovakia 0.15 0.46 0.3 
Finland 0.28 0.46 0.37 
Sweden 0.23 0.4 0.3 
United Kingdom 0.19 0.34 0.24 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on AMECO data.  
Table 13 presents average annual and cumulative balance of each country vis-à-vis the 
system. The first column shows the average annual balance for the whole period (1999-2012). 
The second column shows the average annual balance for the period prior to the Great 
Recession (1999-2008). The third column shows the average annual balance for the Great 
Recession period and its aftermath (2009-2012).  
We see that during good times, only Spain and Poland had larger annual negative balance – 
0.22% and 0.21% of GDP. By the same token, only the Netherlands had a significant average 
annual surplus (0.21%). After 2009, Estonia, Greece, Spain, Latvia and Lithuania exceed 
average annual negative balance of more than 0.2% of GDP. During this period, no country 
has an average surplus of more than 0.2% of GDP.  
However, even smaller surpluses or deficits can accumulate into larger totals over a period 
of more than a decade. If we set 1% of GDP as the threshold for triggering the increase in the 
contribution, then Greece, Spain, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Finland accumulate deficits 
of such magnitude that in option 1b they trigger an increase in the contribution.  
Malta, the Netherlands and Austria instead cumulatively contribute more than 1% of 2012 
GDP compared to what they pay in.  
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Table 13. EUI average annual balance and cumulative balance by country, % of GDP 
 
Average annual 
balance 
1999-2012 
Average annual 
balance 
1999-2008 
Average annual 
balance 
2009-2012 
Cumulative 
balance 
(% of 2012 GDP) 
Belgium 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.70 
Bulgaria -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.13 
Czech Republic 0.03 0.05 -0.01 0.35 
Denmark 0.04 0.08 -0.04 0.48 
Germany  0.00 -0.02 0.05 0.07 
Estonia -0.10 -0.05 -0.25 -0.88 
Ireland 0.00 0.07 -0.18 -0.03 
Greece -0.08 0.00 -0.28 -1.16 
Spain -0.41 -0.22 -0.88 -5.36 
France -0.05 -0.03 -0.08 -0.55 
Croatia -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.30 
Italy 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.59 
Cyprus 0.02 0.07 -0.13 0.03 
Latvia -0.17 -0.10 -0.36 -1.70 
Lithuania -0.18 -0.11 -0.33 -1.57 
Luxembourg 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.45 
Hungary -0.01 0.04 -0.13 -0.27 
Malta 0.10 0.10 0.09 1.05 
Netherlands 0.20 0.21 0.15 2.34 
Austria 0.10 0.10 0.10 1.12 
Poland -0.20 -0.23 -0.11 -1.65 
Portugal 0.00 0.07 -0.17 -0.15 
Romania 0.09 0.12 0.02 0.73 
Slovenia 0.06 0.09 -0.03 0.63 
Slovakia -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.37 
Finland -0.09 -0.10 -0.08 -1.00 
Sweden -0.01 0.01 -0.07 -0.18 
United Kingdom 0.07 0.09 0.01 0.87 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on AMECO data.  
We aggregate figures to present the overall balance at the EU level. Figure 8 shows revenues 
and expenditures for the whole system as a percentage of GDP. We can see that while the 
revenues are essentially flat at around 0.3% of GDP, expenditures oscillate much more – 
between 0.25% just prior to the Great Recession and 0.4% during most of it. Expenditure is 
therefore sensitive to the business cycle, in an anti-cyclical fashion (as it is supposed to be) 
whereas revenues are rather constant.   
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Figure 8. Revenue and expenditure at the EU level as % of GDP 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on AMECO data.  
Figure 9 shows annual and cumulative balances at the EU level. The annual balance line is 
unsurprising as it is essentially the difference between revenue and expenditure in the first 
chart. It is mildly positive for most of the years before the Great Recession and then it stays 
in negative territory, showing annual deficits of between 0.05% and 0.1% of GDP.  
A more interesting piece of information is the cumulative balance of the whole system 
expressed as a percentage of a given year’s GDP. Had the system been in place since 1999, 
the EUI would not have required additional financial injection after its start. Indeed, it would 
have accumulated reserves all the way up to 2008. However, the reserves would then all 
have been spent in 2009 and the cumulative deficit would continue to increase during the 
2010-2012 period. This raises the issue of additional EUI financing needs under such 
circumstances. Given the system performance prior to 2009, there could be a reasonable 
expectation that the money would be recovered over the long run, but the interim period 
could be an extended one. 
Figure 9. Annual and cumulative balance at the EU level as % of GDP 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on AMECO data.  
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4.1.2 The harmonised unemployment system with long-term country-level 
neutral budgetary position (Option 1b)  
We now move from Option 1a to Option 1b. The two differ in a single but crucial element: 
we now have a system that aims to be balanced in the medium-to-long run for each member 
state. This means that a state can run a yearly deficit vis-à-vis the system in case of 
recessions, but needs to repay the loan in the medium-to-long run. As a consequence, 
redistribution between countries is allowed, but only temporarily.  
The rebalancing is achieved by doubling the contribution rate from 0.5% to 1% of the base for 
countries that have a cumulative deficit with the system of at least 1% of GDP. The double 
contribution rate would stop once the cumulative deficit falls again to below 1% of GDP.18 
For this option, we do not provide expenditure data on a country basis since the expenditure 
is identical to Option 1a, the difference lies on the revenue side. 
Table 14 shows revenues by country as a percentage of GDP for the period 1999-2012. As 
with the previous option, we show the minimum value achieved annually, the maximum 
value and the mean. The bottom values remain the same as in Option 1a – if we take out 
Luxembourg, then 0.22% of GDP is the lowest any country (Slovakia) pays in any year, and 
0.23% of GDP is the lowest average contribution by a country (also Slovakia).  
To repeat from Option 1a, given that the contribution mechanism is set up as the same 
percentage of nominal compensation, the differences primarily reflect different shares of 
labour compensation in GDP. In that sense, it is mildly anti-cyclical as it tends to decline in 
periods of high unemployment, but only to a limited extent. 
Table 14. EUI annual revenues by country as % of GDP (minimum, maximum and mean values) 
 Min. Max. Mean (1999-2012) 
Belgium 0.3 0.32 0.31 
Bulgaria 0.23 0.27 0.25 
Czech Republic 0.23 0.26 0.25 
Denmark 0.28 0.31 0.29 
Germany  0.28 0.3 0.29 
Estonia 0.24 0.29 0.26 
Ireland 0.23 0.28 0.25 
Greece 0.25 0.29 0.27 
Spain 0.29 0.62 0.43 
France 0.31 0.32 0.31 
Croatia 0.28 0.31 0.29 
Italy 0.27 0.31 0.29 
Cyprus 0.27 0.3 0.28 
Latvia 0.23 0.49 0.3 
Lithuania 0.23 0.44 0.28 
Luxembourg 0.14 0.18 0.16 
Hungary 0.23 0.25 0.24 
                                                     
18 Alternatively, the stop could be set to balance – 0% of GDP. This would not have much of an effect 
on the current simulation. 
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Malta 0.25 0.26 0.26 
Netherlands 0.35 0.38 0.36 
Austria 0.32 0.34 0.33 
Poland 0.23 0.53 0.32 
Portugal 0.28 0.3 0.29 
Romania 0.27 0.39 0.31 
Slovenia 0.3 0.33 0.31 
Slovakia 0.22 0.25 0.23 
Finland 0.27 0.3 0.28 
Sweden 0.28 0.3 0.29 
United Kingdom 0.3 0.32 0.31 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on AMECO data.  
Where it becomes different and interesting, of course, is with regard to maximum values. 
Given their accumulated deficit of more than 1% of GDP at some point, Spain, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Poland have to contribute more for a period of time. For Spain, this applies to 
2005 and the period from 2008 onwards. Latvia has to double its contributions in 2010 and 
since, as did Lithuania in 2011 and 2012. For Poland, the relevant period is 2003-2006. In 
2013, they would be joined by Greece, which hit a cumulative deficit of 1.16% of GDP in that 
year. This also shows the disadvantage of the balancing system. The 1% benchmark provides 
breathing space when a country pays regular contributions but receives much higher 
benefits, but if there is a sustained spell of high unemployment, the doubled contributions 
can erase the anti-cyclical impact in those later years.  
The annual and cumulative balance numbers do not change for most countries, meaning that 
they do not cross the 1% line. Both their revenues and expenditures stay the same compared 
to Option 1a. However, for the four countries mentioned above, the need to contribute more 
improves their balance vis-à-vis the system.  
Table 15. EUI average annual balance and cumulative balance by country, % of GDP 
 
Average 
annual 
balance 
1999-2012 
Average 
annual 
balance 
1999-2008 
Average 
annual 
balance 
2009-2012 
Cumulative 
balance (% of 
2012 GDP) 
Option 1a 
cumulative 
balance (% of 
2012 GDP) 
Spain -0.28 -0.16 -0.58 -3.54 -5.36 
Latvia -0.12 -0.10 -0.19 -1.06 -1.70 
Lithuania -0.14 -0.11 -0.22 -1.14 -1.57 
Poland -0.13 -0.13 -0.11 -1.06 -1.65 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on AMECO data.  
The increased revenue ensures that, during good times, no country has an average annual 
deficit of 0.2% of GDP or higher (this was the case for Poland and Spain in option 1a). It also 
ensures that the cumulative balance is cut from 5.36% of GDP to 3.54% of GDP for Spain, and 
from the 1.5-1.7% range to the 1-1.2% for the three others. Of course, the decrease would 
continue further in 2013 and onwards. 
The increased revenue for certain countries also increases system-wide revenues in certain 
years, as we can see in Figure 10. Compared to option 1a, the expenditure profile stays the 
48  BEBLAVÝ & MASELLI 
same, but we see a slight increase in revenue in the early to mid-2000 due to higher Spanish 
and Polish contributions, and then much higher contributions from 2009 onwards. 
Figure 10. Revenue and expenditure at the EU level, % of GDP 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on AMECO data.  
This leads to higher annual surpluses in good times and smaller annual deficits during the 
Great Recession, as Figure 11 shows. It also makes the system much more solvent; despite 
the Great Recession, it is only in 2012 that it would require additional injection. 
Figure 11. Annual and cumulative balance at the EU level, % of GDP 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on AMECO data.  
4.2 The reinsurance system  
We call option 2 the reinsurance scheme. The insured identity is not the single worker at risk 
of unemployment, as in option 1, but states or, more precisely, national insurance funds. The 
basic idea is to transfer funds from the centre to the periphery to finance unemployment 
benefits when unemployment is measurably higher than normal.  
In our simulation, the assistance is triggered when the unemployment rate is higher than 
NAWRU by two percentage points in a certain country. This choice of trigger is arbitrary and 
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smaller values could be chosen.19 However, the value is consistent with the idea of 
reinsurance intervening only in exceptional or catastrophic circumstances, in other words, a 
major increase in the unemployment rates.   
The payout is a subsidy to the national budget equivalent to the sum of all unemployment 
benefits for a six-month benefit period calculated on the same basis as option 1 (40% of 
nominal compensation, 75% of unemployed for less than one year covered). The payout 
would not be conditional; gross transfers from the EUI could be used as national 
governments see fit (though of course if conditionality were imposed, this would have no 
impact on the fiscal calculations that follow). 
The insurance would be funded by member states’ contributions. These would amount to 
0.1% of GDP annually until 0.5% of EU GDP is accumulated. Then contributions would stop 
and would be restarted if the fund fell to under 0.5% of EU output. 
On the expenditure side, we model the following rule: if the difference between the annual 
unemployment rate and NAWRU in each country is higher than 2%, then the country in 
question receives a payout equal to 75% of the number of unemployed workers (below 12 
months) multiplied by 40% of their average nominal compensation.   
                                                  
As with option 1, we present results for the two versions of this second option. In the first 
(option 2a), no fiscal rule is applied. In other words, countries can be permanently in deficit 
or surplus vis-à-vis the system without any corrective mechanisms. This represents a truly 
European system, which essentially ignores boundaries in the fiscal sense, and also a real 
insurance based on the idea that such a shock is randomly distributed.  
In the second version (option 2b), countries are required to maintain a neutral budgetary 
position. The system would aim to be balanced in the medium-to-long run for each member 
state. This would be achieved by setting an additional contribution of 0.2% of GDP payable 
annually by countries that have a cumulative deficit with the system of at least 1% of GDP. 
The additional contribution is due every year, regardless of whether the regular contribution 
is being paid and stops once the cumulative deficit falls below 1% of GDP.20  
4.2.1 The reinsurance scheme with no fiscal rule (option 2a) 
As with Options 1a and 1b, we show detailed results of our simulation. This includes: 
- system revenues by country (who pays how much in); 
- system expenditure by country (who gets how much out); 
- annual balance at the country-level, i.e. the net stimulus provided by the EUI; 
- cumulative balance, i.e. long-term balance of each country with the EUI; and 
- revenues, expenditures, and annual and cumulative balance for the system as a whole. 
Revenues are easily counted in this case since every country pays the same – zero or 0.1% of 
GDP, depending on the aggregate balance of the fund. Between 1999 and 2004, all countries 
pay to gradually build up the fund. Then between 2005 and 2009, we see the stop-start 
mechanism of contributions and at the same time, only minor or no payouts. The situation 
changes in 2010: contributions restart on a sustained basis to replenish the fund. 
                                                     
19 Values greater than NAWRU + 2 percentage points would instead make no sense as they would 
apply to an extremely limited number of cases.  
20 Alternatively, the stop could be set to balance – 0% of GDP. This would not have much effect on the 
current simulation. 
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Figure 12. EUI annual revenues for each country, % of GDP 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on AMECO data.  
The clear difference between the two scenarios is that the contribution demanded for 
reinsurance is much smaller than under the harmonised system. We see that the mechanism 
is indeed much smaller – on average 0.07% of GDP annually, and that included building up 
the fund. In the years since the 0.5% of GDP level was reached (in 2006), it would have been 
only 0.05% of GDP on average. 
The payouts are much more varied and many member states would not have received any 
during the period, since their unemployment rates stayed below the trigger. However, 
countries that do receive a payout receive support that is comparable in size to the 
harmonised scheme. As a consequence: 
- the stabilising effect of reinsurance is bigger because a similar premium is received for a 
smaller annual contribution; and 
- the same goal is achieved at a smaller cost with the reinsurance scheme. 
Table 16 provides detailed information on the annual expenditure, divided into the pre- and 
post-crisis periods.  
Table 16. Overall EUI annual expenditure since 2009 by country and maximum value as % of GDP 
 
Total payout 
1999-2012 
Total payout  
2009-2012 
Highest annual  
payout 
Belgium 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Bulgaria 0.80 0.00 0.43 
Czech Republic 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Denmark 0.36 0.36 0.36 
Germany 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Estonia 1.46 1.46 0.76 
Ireland 1.76 1.76 0.57 
Greece 1.94 1.37 0.73 
Spain 4.75 4.75 1.30 
France 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0 
0,02 
0,04 
0,06 
0,08 
0,1 
0,12 
Revenue 
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Croatia 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Italy 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Cyprus 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Latvia 2.43 2.43 0.89 
Lithuania 3.66 2.26 0.72 
Luxembourg 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Hungary 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Malta 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Netherlands 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Austria 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Poland 2.27 0.00 0.66 
Portugal 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Romania 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Slovenia 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Slovakia 0.89 0.00 0.46 
Finland 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sweden 0.00 0.00 0.00 
United Kingdom 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Source: Own elaboration based on AMECO data.  
The countries receiving more than 1% of GDP overall are: Estonia (1.46%), Ireland (1.76%), 
Greece (1.94%), Spain (4.75%), Latvia (2.43%), Lithuania (3.66%) and Poland (2.27%). The vast 
majority of payouts for these countries occur after 2009, but there are exceptions (Lithuania 
in 2000-2002, Poland in 2002-2005, and Greece in 1999-2000). 
If we look at total balance, we get a similar though more sophisticated picture. Only for 
Spain is the total annual average balance greater than 0.2% of GDP (0.27%), and only for 
Latvia and Lithuania is it also more than 0.1% (0.1% and 0.19%, respectively). This illustrates 
how the system is less likely than option 1 to produce significant long-term beneficiaries 
even without additional contributions (which will be added in option 2b). By design, it is 
impossible for any country to be a net payer of the order of magnitude of 0.2% of GDP or 
more for any sustained period of time.  
However, during the Great Recession and its aftermath, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, 
Latvia and Lithuania all receive on average over 0.2% of GDP more than they pay in 
annually. Spain (4%), Latvia (1.52%) and Lithuania (1.95%) also accumulate a total negative 
cumulative balance of more than 1% of GDP by 2012. No country accumulates more than 1% 
of GDP of cumulative surplus, though Portugal and some other countries come close. The 
Portuguese case also demonstrates one disadvantage of this option: a country with 
consistently poor performance can be in a situation where its deviation from its ‘normal’ is 
never large enough to warrant assistance and it ends up as a net payer despite its significant 
suffering.  
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Table 17. Annual balance overview 
 
Average annual 
balance 
1999-2012 
Average annual 
balance 
1999-2008 
Average annual 
balance 
2009-2012 
Cumulative 
balance 
(% of 2012 GDP) 
Belgium 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.80 
Bulgaria 0.01 -0.01 0.08 0.28 
Czech Republic 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.67 
Denmark 0.05 0.07 -0.01 0.48 
Germany 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.85 
Estonia -0.03 0.07 -0.29 -0.58 
Ireland -0.05 0.07 -0.36 -0.88 
Greece -0.07 0.01 -0.27 -0.91 
Spain -0.27 0.07 -1.11 -4.00 
France 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.83 
Croatia 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.76 
Italy 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.88 
Cyprus 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.75 
Latvia -0.10 0.07 -0.53 -1.52 
Lithuania -0.19 -0.07 -0.49 -1.95 
Luxembourg 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.70 
Hungary 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.79 
Malta 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.76 
Netherlands 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.84 
Austria 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.80 
Poland -0.09 -0.16 0.08 -0.59 
Portugal 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.90 
Romania 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.58 
Slovenia 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.80 
Slovakia 0.01 -0.02 0.08 0.29 
Finland 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.81 
Sweden 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.75 
United Kingdom 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.90 
Source: Own elaboration based on AMECO data.  
At the EU level, the system is much more volatile on both the revenue and the expenditure 
side than Option 1, as befits a reinsurance system. The following figure shows that revenues 
for the whole system are identical to the national-level revenues shown above. Expenditures 
are quite low during the ‘good times’, with small payouts of less than 0.02% of EU GDP 
between 1999 and 2008 and a few years of no payouts. After 2009, the system would be 
paying out between 0.11% and 0.12% of EU GDP annually.  
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Figure 13. Revenue and expenditure at the EU level, % of GDP 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on AMECO data.  
The annual balance of the system is determined by interaction between the start-and-stop 
revenue system and catastrophic event-based payouts. In early years, it is mostly in surplus 
of close to 0.1% of GDP as member states pay to build up the fund and do not get much in 
return. Since then, with the exception of 2009, the balance is zero or close to zero as 
significant payouts are balanced or nearly balanced by restart of the contributions. As a 
result, the cumulative fund balance shows the initial build-up to 0.5% of GDP, then 
stagnation, then a sharp cut in 2009 and since then a gradual mild erosion as payouts are 
somewhat larger than the restarted contributions. 
Figure 14. Annual and cumulative balance at the EU level, % of GDP 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on AMECO data.  
4.2.2 The reinsurance scheme with long-term country-level neutral budgetary 
position (option 2b) 
Option 2b is identical to option 2a but with the added need for a country-level neutral 
budgetary position. The system would aim to be balanced in the medium-to-long run for 
each member state. This would be achieved by setting an additional contribution of 0.2% of 
GDP payable annually by countries that have a cumulative deficit with the system of at least 
1% of GDP. The additional contribution is due every year, regardless of whether the regular 
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contribution is being paid and would stop once the cumulative deficit falls below 1% of 
GDP.  
Table 18. EUI annual revenues by country, % of GDP (mean value) 
Country Average contribution 
Belgium 0.07 
Bulgaria 0.07 
Czech Republic 0.07 
Denmark 0.07 
Germany 0.07 
Estonia 0.07 
Ireland 0.07 
Greece 0.07 
Spain 0.10 
France 0.07 
Croatia 0.07 
Italy 0.07 
Cyprus 0.07 
Latvia 0.10 
Lithuania 0.11 
Luxembourg 0.07 
Hungary 0.07 
Malta 0.07 
Netherlands 0.07 
Austria 0.07 
Poland 0.10 
Portugal 0.07 
Romania 0.07 
Slovenia 0.07 
Slovakia 0.07 
Finland 0.07 
Sweden 0.07 
United Kingdom 0.07 
Source: Own elaboration based on AMECO data.  
This would mean that, unlike in option 2a, countries would not all have equal average 
contributions over a longer period. As shown in the table below, most would still pay 0.07% 
of GDP on average (due to the fact that the contribution of 0.1% would not be payable in 
every year), but Spain, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland would pay more, at 0.1%. 
We do not provide expenditure data on a country basis since the expenditure is identical to 
option 2a. The difference is on the revenue side.  
What changes is the balance, of course, for the four countries that would have to pay 
additional revenue. By 2012, Latvia and Lithuania would be close to rebalancing their 
relationship with the system and Poland would have already rebalanced it. On the other 
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hand, the ongoing unemployment crisis in Spain and its severity would mean that even 
higher contributions would not have changed its fiscal relationship with the system by much 
in 2012. 
Table 19. EUI average annual balance and cumulative balance by country, % of GDP 
 
BALANCE 
1999-2012 
BALANCE 
2009-2012 
BALANCE 
1999- 2008 
Cumulative 
balance 
Option 2A 
Cumulative 
balance (% of 2012 
GDP) 
Belgium 1.0 0.3 0.7 0.80 0.80 
Bulgaria 0.2 0.3 -0.1 0.28 0.28 
Czech 
Republic 
1.0 0.3 0.7 0.67 0.67 
Denmark 0.6 -0.1 0.7 0.48 0.48 
Germany 1.0 0.3 0.7 0.85 0.85 
Estonia -0.5 -1.2 0.7 -0.58 -0.58 
Ireland -0.8 -1.5 0.7 -0.88 -0.88 
Greece -0.9 -1.1 0.1 -0.91 -0.91 
Spain -3.4 -4.1 0.7 -3.60 -4.00 
France 1.0 0.3 0.7 0.83 0.83 
Croatia 1.0 0.3 0.7 0.76 0.76 
Italy 1.0 0.3 0.7 0.88 0.88 
Cyprus 1.0 0.3 0.7 0.75 0.75 
Latvia -1.0 -1.7 0.7 -1.14 -1.52 
Lithuania -2.1 -1.4 -0.7 -1.39 -1.95 
Luxembourg 1.0 0.3 0.7 0.70 0.70 
Hungary 1.0 0.3 0.7 0.79 0.79 
Malta 1.0 0.3 0.7 0.76 0.76 
Netherlands 1.0 0.3 0.7 0.84 0.84 
Austria 1.0 0.3 0.7 0.80 0.80 
Poland -0.9 0.3 -1.2 -0.32 -0.59 
Portugal 1.0 0.3 0.7 0.90 0.90 
Romania 1.0 0.3 0.7 0.58 0.58 
Slovenia 1.0 0.3 0.7 0.80 0.80 
Slovakia 0.1 0.3 -0.2 0.29 0.29 
Finland 1.0 0.3 0.7 0.81 0.81 
Sweden 1.0 0.3 0.7 0.75 0.75 
United 
Kingdom 
1.0 0.3 0.7 0.90 0.90 
Source: Own elaboration based on AMECO data.  
Looking at the revenues and expenditures at the system level, the results are similar to 
option 2a. The differences are on the revenue side and are relatively small. We can see that, 
after 2010, the overall revenue gradually rises from the standard 0.1% of GDP to 0.12% as 
some countries pay additional contributions.  
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Figure 15. Revenue and expenditure at the EU level, % of GDP 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on AMECO data.  
Looking at the fund balance, the additional revenue is sufficient to stabilise the fund at 0.4% 
of GDP during the Great Recession and its aftermath, but the difference is fairly small.  
Figure 16. Annual and cumulative balance at the EU level, % of GDP 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on AMECO data.  
Overall, at the system level we see that the additional contributions paid by countries with 
deep deficits can be important for those countries’ fiscal relationship vis-à-vis the system, but 
do not make much difference to the system as a whole. On the other hand, such statements 
are based on re-running a historical situation in which none of the truly largest economies 
(France, Germany, Italy and the UK) was eligible for the payout on a sustained basis. 
4.3 Comparisons of options 
In this section, we compare the four options to better present their similarities and 
differences to the reader. We start with the EU level and then proceed to present the 
simulation for several member states as an illustration. 
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4.3.1 Comparison of the options at the EU level 
We start with revenues. The following figure shows stark differences between options 1 and 
2. Option 2, despite the initial five-year period to build up the fund, is much less costly than 
option 1, since it is a form of catastrophe insurance for member states, whereas option 1 is a 
form of permanent redistribution. Of course, option 1, unlike option 2, can replace the 
national schemes to some extent, so this does not imply that the overall public revenue and 
expenditure in member states plus the EU would be increased. It could simply be transferred 
from member states to the supranational level. 
In the 14-year period we simulate, differences between the a and b options appear to be 
relatively small for option 2, but more significant for option 1, where the need to rebalance a 
country’s relationship with the system if the accumulated deficit exceeds 1% of GDP leads to 
a more sustained increase in revenues.  
Figure 17. EUI revenues and expenditure under various options, as % of GDP 
Revenues Expenditure 
  
Source: Own elaboration based on AMECO data.  
Expenditure does not differ between the a and b options as the difference is on the revenue 
side. Therefore, we can only compare expenditure overall under options 1 and 2. What we 
can see in the figure is the same as in the revenue figure, only more pronounced. The 
reinsurance option lies essentially dormant (helping an individual member state here and 
there) until the Great Recession, when it kicks into action. Expenditure for option 1 is also 
effectively anti-cyclical at the EU level, ranging from 0.25% of GDP to 0.4%, but with a 
baseline component that distributes significant amounts even at the best of times.  
The most complicated figure so far is the comparison of annual balances. In good times, 
options 1 and 2 are both neutral as assistance to individual countries is not sufficient to 
significantly influence the overall system balance. The only exception is the initial build-up 
of funding under option 2. However, in difficult times after 2009, both options initially go 
deeply into deficit. Afterwards, their reactions differ. At one end of the range, option 2b 
quickly regains balance at the EU level, while at the other end, Option 1a continues with a 
deficit of between 0.05% and 0.1% of GDP until 2012. Therefore, the desirability of the 
various options at the EU level depends also on what policy-makers view as a preferable 
approach. 
Figure 18. EUI annual and cumulative balance of the EU under various options, % of GDP 
Annual balance Cumulative balance 
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Source: Own elaboration based on AMECO data. 
Different annual balances also translate into different cumulative balances. For option 2, the 
differences between a and b lead to a small cumulative difference. The real difference is 
between option 1 and 2. Option 1 goes into cumulative deficit, which becomes a system-wide 
deficit under both a and b by 2012 (though the b option, by increasing revenue, results in a 
much smaller deficit). The calibration of the various options is, of course, only an illustration, 
but it shows that for option 1, policy-makers would need to have a financial backstopping 
facility of some kind (e.g. an extraordinary contribution or loans). 
4.3.2 Comparison of the options for selected countries 
In this part of the report, we present a comparison of the four options for individual member 
states. To help the reader, in this section we reproduce the table that summarises the four 
scenarios analysed: the harmonised European unemployment benefit system and the 
reinsurance scheme, each with two different fiscal rules.  
We focus on two groups where the results are likely to be of interest: countries suffering 
most from the Great Recession, and countries that are likely to be long-term net payers. 
Specifically, we look at Spain, Greece, Latvia, Ireland, the Netherlands, Austria and 
Germany. We present the four options for each of these countries, together with the annual 
and cumulative balance.  
Table 20. Matrix of scenarios explored  
 
No long-term country-level 
budgetary neutrality 
Long-term country-level 
budgetary neutrality 
Harmonised European 
unemployment benefit 
Option 1a Option 1b 
Unemployment reinsurance  Option 2a Option 2b 
Source: Own elaboration. 
Spain 
Spain is the heaviest user of the EUI under all options. It is therefore not surprising that, with 
the balancing requirement of option b, this also leads to higher payments into the system. 
Under option 1b, this reaches approximately 0.6% after 2008. It is milder under option 2b, 
but Spain would still be paying 0.3% of GDP (three-times higher than most other member 
states since 2011). 
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Figure 19. EUI revenues and expenditure paid by and to Spain under various options, as % of GDP 
Revenues Expenditure 
  
Source: Own elaboration based on AMECO data.  
What Spain would receive from the EUI varies dramatically during the good times, but less 
so during the bad times. Until 2008, reinsurance would not pay Spain anything since its 
situation is not dramatic enough. Under the harmonised system, however, Spain would 
receive between 0.4% and 0.6% of GDP, significantly more than other member states even 
prior to the Great Recession. However, during the recession and its aftermath, the EUI 
expenditure of both systems converges at a very high level, approximately 1.3% of GDP, 
reflecting the dramatic deterioration in Spanish unemployment. 
The heavy reliance of Spain on the EUI is also demonstrated by its annual balance, which is 
negative even during the good times under the harmonised system, though not under 
reinsurance. It becomes very negative during the Great Recession, though the balance 
depends heavily on the option chosen, ranging from approximately 0.6% of GDP annually 
under reinsurance with a tighter fiscal rule to 1-1.2% annually under the harmonised system 
with no budgetary neutrality. 
Figure 20. EUI annual and cumulative balance of Spain under various options, % of GDP 
Annual balance Cumulative balance 
  
Source: Own elaboration based on AMECO data.  
Consequently, the cumulative balance of Spain with the system worsens throughout the 
entire period (if one discounts the initial fund-building period in Option 2). By the end of 
2012, it would have been in the red to the tune of between 3.5% and 4% of GDP under all 
options except for 1a, where it would have been even higher (around 5% of GDP).  
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Greece 
Greece pays standard revenues into the system despite its repeated use, since it did not cross 
the 1% accumulated deficit threshold before 2012 (though it would in the following years). 
We can see a gradual decline in revenues as its employment decreases during the crisis. 
Figure 21. EUI revenues and expenditure paid by and to Greece under various options, as % of GDP 
Revenues Expenditure 
  
Source: Own elaboration based on AMECO data.  
Greece’s payout from the EUI would reach high levels of 0.6-0.7% of GDP annually during 
the Great Recession under both options, but it would arrive later under Option 2. 
Greece’s annual balance turns dramatically negative during the Great Recession as one 
would expect, reaching 0.5% to 0.6% of GDP annually. The main difference between the two 
options in terms of annual balance is when and how much. Reinsurance would kick in later 
but with a stronger stimulative effect, due to lower revenues paid into the EUI.  
Figure 22. EUI annual and cumulative balance of Greece under various options, % of GDP 
Annual balance Cumulative balance 
  
Source: Own elaboration based on AMECO data.  
The cumulative balance of Greece vis-à-vis the system turns sharply negative during the 
Great Recession and its aftermath. There is no difference between the a and b options (with 
or without rebalancing) and even the difference between the two systems proposed is not 
dramatic, at approximately 0.2% of GDP on a cumulative basis. 
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Latvia 
Latvia is an example of a country where the balancing requirements might make a dramatic 
difference. As a heavy user, it would, under both options, have to pay in much more after 
2010, but the difference is between roughly 0.25% of GDP under option 1a and 0.5% of GDP 
under 1b. For option 2, it is similar: 0.1% for 2a and 0.3% for 2b. 
Figure 23. EUI revenues and expenditure paid by and to Latvia under various options, as % of GDP 
Revenues Expenditure 
  
Source: Own elaboration based on AMECO data.  
On the expenditure side, Latvia illustrates well that reinsurance (option 2) comes with 
limitations since it is essentially a binary mechanism, either activated or not. In the early 
2000s, when Latvia suffered high unemployment, option 2 would not help because the 
difference was not dramatic enough and the benchmark value started from a high historical 
level. Option 1 provides a more calibrated assistance and expenditure by the EUI gradually 
declines from a high level. On the other hand, in the Great Recession, both options perform 
similarly in terms of payouts because the shock was severe. 
The annual balance of the Latvia-EUI financial relationship has a similar pattern under all 
options: worsening dramatically in 2009 and then recovering. What distinguished the 
various options is how quickly and to what extent they bring the relationship back to annual 
balance. Option 1b is the quickest and 2a has the most gradual return, with a deficit of more 
than 0.3% of GDP even in 2012. 
Figure 24. EUI annual and cumulative balance of Latvia under various options, % of GDP 
Annual balance Cumulative balance 
  
Source: Own elaboration based on AMECO data.  
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The difference in annual balance development understandably shows in the cumulative 
balance, where the Latvians accumulate significant deficit, but its size differs. The differences 
are significant – between 1% and 1.5% of GDP by 2012. Options 1b and 2b bring the 
cumulative balance almost back to 1%, while 2a has the highest cumulative deficit. 
Ireland 
Irish employees produce an annual revenue under the harmonised scheme of around 0.25% 
of GDP with minor fluctuations. Under reinsurance, the contribution remains fixed at 0.1% 
and drops to zero once the balance reaches 0.5% of GDP. Expenditure co-moves in the two 
systems: it is essentially zero for reinsurance and under 0.2% for the harmonised scheme up 
to 2008. Afterwards, with the start of the Great Recession, it suddenly peaks at 0.6% and then 
starts decreasing again to reach 0.35% in 2012. This increase is a natural consequence of the 
abrupt deterioration in unemployment figures, which multiply four-fold in less than a 
decade.  
Figure 25. EUI revenues and expenditure paid by and to Ireland under various options, as % of GDP 
Revenues Expenditure 
  
Source: Own elaboration based on AMECO data.  
The annual balance remains positive until 2008 and then turns suddenly negative, at up to -
0.3% of GDP for the harmonised case and -0.6% for reinsurance, with the latter therefore 
providing a stronger relief to public finances in the case of extreme need. All in all, the 
cumulative balance remains close to zero in the harmonised EUI, whereas it reaches -0.9% of 
GDP for reinsurance. Had the latter system been in place, therefore, Ireland would have been 
very close to the need for readjustment in the next few years to restore the balance in the 
medium term.  
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Figure 26. EUI annual and cumulative balance of Ireland under various options, % of GDP 
Annual balance Cumulative balance 
  
Source: Own elaboration based on AMECO data.  
All in all, the Irish case illustrates well the conceptual difference between the two systems 
simulated: the harmonised scheme protects against all downturns up to a certain level, 
whereas reinsurance only intervenes in extreme cases, but with more proportional support.   
The Netherlands 
On the revenue side, Dutch workers generate annually a stable income of 0.35-0.38% of GDP 
during the period 1999-2012 for the harmonised scheme and 0.1% for reinsurance. The latter 
is never used during the period analysed, due to the fact that shocks fall under the ‘business 
as usual’ category. The harmonised scheme, instead, follows an upward trend because the 
number of unemployed workers doubles after reaching a minimum in 2001 (from 205,700 to 
469,000), despite the positive performance observed just before the start of the Great 
Recession.   
Figure 27. EUI revenues and expenditure paid by and to the Netherlands under various options, 
as % of GDP 
Revenues Expenditure 
  
Source: Own elaboration based on AMECO data.  
The annual balance strongly reflects the unemployment cycle in the harmonised system but 
in cumulative terms as a result of the good performance of its labour market, the 
Netherlands would accumulate a balance of 1.2%.    
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Figure 28. EUI annual and cumulative balance of the Netherlands under various options, % of GDP 
Annual balance Cumulative balance 
  
Source: Own elaboration based on AMECO data.  
Austria 
The Austrian case is straightforward. In terms of revenue, it produces 0.33-0.34% of GDP 
every year in the harmonised system and 0.1% for reinsurance, with an exception made for 
years where the contribution stops. Expenditure under the latter is zero between 1999 and 
2012; unemployment remains well below the trigger of NAWRU +2%.  
Figure 29. EUI revenues and expenditure paid by and to Austria under various options, as % of GDP 
Revenues Expenditure 
  
Source: Own elaboration based on AMECO data.  
As a consequence of the good performance of its labour market, Austria keeps a positive 
balance vis-à-vis the system every year, which translates into a cumulative balance of at least 
0.8% of GDP in 2012.  
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Figure 30. EUI annual and cumulative balance of Austria under various options, % of GDP 
Annual balance Cumulative balance 
  
Source: Own elaboration based on AMECO data.  
Germany 
In both options, Germany generates stable annual revenues, amounting to 0.3% of GDP in 
the harmonised system and 0.1% in the reinsurance scheme (with an exception made for 
years where the contribution stops). 
On the expenditure side, Germany’s performance is strongly positive – no use of the 
reinsurance is made between 1999 and 2012 – while in the harmonised unemployment 
benefit system, it shows an overall declining trend due to the good performance of the 
labour market, after a peak in 2003-2005. During the period analysed, the unemployment 
rate drops from 8.6 to 5.5% and so too would have expenditure under the harmonised 
unemployment benefits, from 0.32% in 1999 to 0.2% of GDP in 2012. 
Figure 31. EUI revenues and expenditure paid by and to Germany under various options, 
as % of GDP 
Revenues Expenditure 
  
Source: Own elaboration based on AMECO data.  
The overall balance remains positive at the end of the simulated period, yet with large 
differences between the two systems. The harmonised European unemployment benefit 
scheme ends up very close to zero after an alternation of positive (2000-2001 and 2007-2012) 
and negative contributions (1999 and 2002-2006). With the reinsurance, Germany remains a 
net contributor over the entire period because ups and downs in the unemployment rates 
exist but are in the range of a normal business cycle.   
0,00 
0,05 
0,10 
0,15 
1
9
9
9
 
2
0
0
0
 
2
0
0
1
 
2
0
0
2
 
2
0
0
3
 
2
0
0
4
 
2
0
0
5
 
2
0
0
6
 
2
0
0
7
 
2
0
0
8
 
2
0
0
9
 
2
0
1
0
 
2
0
1
1
 
2
0
1
2
 
1a 1b 2a 2b 
0,00 
0,20 
0,40 
0,60 
0,80 
1,00 
1,20 
1
9
9
9
 
2
0
0
0
 
2
0
0
1
 
2
0
0
2
 
2
0
0
3
 
2
0
0
4
 
2
0
0
5
 
2
0
0
6
 
2
0
0
7
 
2
0
0
8
 
2
0
0
9
 
2
0
1
0
 
2
0
1
1
 
2
0
1
2
 
1a 1b 2a 2b 
0,00 
0,10 
0,20 
0,30 
0,40 
1
9
9
9
 
2
0
0
0
 
2
0
0
1
 
2
0
0
2
 
2
0
0
3
 
2
0
0
4
 
2
0
0
5
 
2
0
0
6
 
2
0
0
7
 
2
0
0
8
 
2
0
0
9
 
2
0
1
0
 
2
0
1
1
 
2
0
1
2
 
1a 1b 2a 2b 
0,00 
0,10 
0,20 
0,30 
0,40 
1
9
9
9
 
2
0
0
0
 
2
0
0
1
 
2
0
0
2
 
2
0
0
3
 
2
0
0
4
 
2
0
0
5
 
2
0
0
6
 
2
0
0
7
 
2
0
0
8
 
2
0
0
9
 
2
0
1
0
 
2
0
1
1
 
2
0
1
2
 
1a 1b 2a 2b 
66  BEBLAVÝ & MASELLI 
Figure 32. EUI annual and cumulative balance of Germany under various options, % of GDP 
Annual balance Cumulative balance 
  
Source: Own elaboration based on AMECO data.  
4.4 Impact of the EUI on stabilisation and growth 
This section presents a range of estimates of stabilisation effects of the European 
unemployment insurance system. We present the estimates for national episodes of major 
distress, sufficient to trigger assistance under both options. We use a simple estimate of the 
stabilisation effect: every year starting from 2008, we multiply the net inflow coming from 
the EUI fund by a multiplier.  
The rationale is that this allows us to calculate the value added of the European mechanism if 
it had existed at the time. We propose calculations only for major shocks because, for minor 
shocks, the shock absorption value is non-existent; national governments are more than able 
to weather them on their own. This does not exclude other rationales for creating an EUI 
even for minor shocks (as presented by the harmonised unemployment insurance system 
compared to the reinsurance scheme).  
Deciding on the multiplier is a non-trivial and somewhat subjective exercise. As shown in 
Box 2, estimations provided by the literature on this issue vary between $0.7 and $3 for every 
$1 spent on unemployment insurance. The issue is complicated further by the fact that 
estimates vary not only according to the methodology chosen, but also by country. An 
additional obstacle is given by the fact that most studies analyse the US example, which on 
the one hand is the closest to the European one in terms of size among advanced economies, 
but on the other, cannot be considered identical due to the fact that the US economy is 
structurally different. We therefore need to make a choice.  
Despite such complications, we consider a multiplier of 1.5 to be safe, which is a conservative 
estimate close to the four of the five studies selected (see Box 2). We apply this multiplier to 
the net inflow from the EUI funds for the period 2008-2012 to six countries as an illustration 
(those that suffered most during the Great Recession).  
Box 2. A review of the literature on the multiplier effect of unemployment benefits 
Among the different categories of public expenditure, unemployment benefits come out with 
the most virtues. First, they kick in automatically, as soon as unemployment starts soaring and 
workers that lose their jobs apply for them. A second important virtue is that this type of 
expenditure goes where it is most needed: to support the consumption capacity of households 
whose labour income has suddenly vanished.  
Since Keynes’ times, economists have believed that public expenditure generates an input to 
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growth that is higher than the expenditure itself due to the multiplier effect. This multiplier 
varies with the type of expenditure as well as according to the characteristics of the economy 
(IMF, 2009).    
Quantifying this multiplier is extremely challenging, as witnessed by the fact that studies do 
not agree on a common number. Different methodologies lead to different results, even when 
the same case is analysed (IMF, 2009). Zandi (2008) calculates that in the US, a $1 increase in 
unemployment benefits generates an estimated $1.64 in near-term GDP. Vroman (2010) 
believes this impact to be larger: every $1 spent on unemployment insurance increases the 
economic activity by $2. An older study by the U.S. Department of Labor estimates that on 
average (over six periods defined between 1972 and 2001) $1 of unemployment insurance 
benefit generated GDP growth of $2.15. The single multiplier effects of these six periods range 
between $1.54 and $3.07. Monacelli et al. (2010) confirm that “in response to an increase in 
government spending normalized to 1 percent of GDP, we estimate an output multiplier well 
above one, in the range of 1.2-1.5 (at one-year and two-year horizon respectively)”.  
Less precise is a recent estimate by the US Congressional Budget Office (2010) according to 
which increasing the aid to the unemployed by $1 is estimated to increase GDP by between 
$0.7$ and $1.9 during the period of 2010 to 2015.  
 
As already explained, we look at episodes of major distress, where the value added of the 
EUI is most relevant. Since the net inflow during such episodes is identical for the 
harmonised and the reinsurance options, we do not show differences between options 1 (the 
harmonised scheme) and 2 (reinsurance), because under the circumstances of major shock 
they produce identical results in our simulation. Given our strong preference for it, we 
consider the case of a fiscal rule that allows deficits and surpluses each year, with the 
obligation to restore a fiscal balance over the cycle. Calculations are showed in Table 21.  
Table 21. Example of stabilisation effect of the EUI during the Great Recession, selected countries 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 SUM 
Estonia 0.00 1.15 0.89 -0.15 -0.15 1.74 
Greece 0.00 0.00 -0.15 0.81 0.95 1.60 
Ireland  0.00 0.85 0.55 0.41 0.37 2.19 
Latvia 0.00 1.34 0.86 0.20 0.19 2.59 
Lithuania 0.00 1.09 0.60 0.21 0.14 2.04 
Spain 0.00 1.79 1.54 1.26 1.49 6.08 
Source: Authors. 
We start with the Spanish case, which in the current crisis is in the limelight due to 
skyrocketing unemployment figures. The net inflow, multiplied by the fiscal multiplier of 
unemployment benefits, generates an additional output equal to between €13 and 19 billion 
every year, starting from 2009. This is equal to 1.3% to 1.8% of GDP. Another interesting case 
is that of the Baltic countries, where the combined effect of the EUI funds and their 
(assumed) multiplier is slightly at above 1% of GDP in 2009. However, it declines faster than 
in Spain due to the faster recovery of the three economies. In Greece, the European 
mechanism kicks in later due to the deterioration of the NAWRU that accompanies the 
increase in unemployment. The total impact on the economy over the entire recession (up to 
2012) is 1.6% of GDP. Finally, in Ireland, EUI funds are provided between 2009 and 2011 and, 
combined with their multiplier effect, generate an additional output equal to between 0.9% 
and 0.4% every year.   
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List of Abbreviations 
AMECO Annual Macroeconomic Database 
CAIF Cyclical Adjustment Insurance Fund 
EB Extended Benefit programme 
EUC08 Emergency Unemployment Compensation 2008 programme 
EC European Commission 
EFTA European Free Trade Association 
EGF European Globalization Adjustment Fund 
ESF European Social Fund 
EMU Economic and Monetary Union 
EU European Union 
EUI European unemployment insurance  
FUTA Federal Unemployment Tax Act 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
ILO International Labour Organization 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
MS Member States 
NAWRU Non-accelerating wage rate of unemployment 
OECD Organization For Economic Cooperation and Development 
SMEs Small and Medium Enterprises 
SUTA State Unemployment Tax Acts 
TEC Treaty of the European Community 
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
UC US unemployment compensation programme 
UTF Unemployment Trust Fund 
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